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INTRODUCTION 
Innovation today is characterized by diverse forms of col-
laboration, multidisciplinary problem solving, interconnected 
technologies, and complex products incorporating multiple in-
ventions. The patent system must adapt to these changes.1 
Faced with increasingly urgent demands for innovation to 
solve economic troubles and address natural and man-made 
crises, the Obama Administration has made national innova-
                                                          
 1. Patent Reform in 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Deci-
sions: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 176 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kappos Testimony] (testimony of David J. Kappos, VP & Asst. GC 
IP Law & Strategy, IBM Corp.) available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/09-03-10Kappostestimony.pdf. 
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tion strategy central to its platform for change.2 Organizational 
innovation is a key part of this national strategy.3 But despite 
the repeated mention of patent reform as part of the national 
innovation strategy, discussions about patents continue to be 
marginalized by government decision-makers in their decisions 
about how to change the organization of economic activities to 
improve innovation outcomes.4 Moreover, while the prolonged 
debates about patent reform offered ample opportunity for 
lawmakers to tie changes to patent law to broader innovation 
goals, patent reforms that respond directly to innovation objec-
tives are notably absent from the recently enacted Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act.5 
I argue that this disconnect between government policies 
focused on the “organization” of innovation, on the one hand, 
and patent policies focused on returns to innovators and the 
costs of patent “monopolies” on the other, is symptomatic of 
broader problems with the design of patent policy.6 Despite 
                                                          
 2. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: 
DRIVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND QUALITY JOBS (2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmerican 
Innovation/. 
 3. Strategies for enhancing U.S. competitiveness include regional clus-
tering, new modes of public-private partnerships, removing barriers to the 
formation of new businesses, and other efforts to support desired forms of eco-
nomic organization. See Startup America: Obama Administration Comments, 
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america-public#4 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (discussing initiatives designed to spur new forms 
of collaboration and to support entrepreneurship). 
 4. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 15 (providing an overview 
of the national innovation strategy and including the patent system to provide 
higher patent quality, faster processing, and more transparency in the patent 
process). 
 5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub.L. 112–29 NO.112–29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011). Complaints about the patent system have focused primarily 
on patent quality, delay in processing patents, and the cost of litigation. E.g., 
Julie A. Hedlund, Patents Pending: Patent Reform for the Innovation Economy, 
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., May 2007, available at 
http://www.itif.org/files/PatentsPending.pdf. The Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act responded to some of these concerns, although the jury is still out on 
the effectiveness of these changes. Significant changes include a switch from a 
“first to invent” to a “first to file” system and elimination of interference pro-
ceedings, eliminating the best mode requirement, limiting false marking suits, 
expanding prior user rights, and the development of new post-grant opposition 
proceedings. But the changes do little if anything to change the direction of 
patent policy. 
 6. In talking about “patent policy” I am using the term loosely to encom-
pass decisions made by legislators, agencies such as the USPTO, DOJ and 
FTC, and, to a lesser extent, courts, about the objectives of patent law and the 
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decades of study and debate we remain largely in the dark as to 
how, and in what ways, patents change behavior. The absence 
of definitive conclusions about whether and how patents im-
prove or impede innovation makes it difficult to overcome the 
political constraints on effective change.7 As a result, opportu-
nities to facilitate different processes of innovation through pa-
tent law change continue to be missed.8 
In this Article, I argue that patent policy-makers have 
been looking in the wrong direction in their efforts to improve 
both the functioning and the relevance of the patent system. 
They have focused too much on using patents to address pre-
sumed sources of general market failure in otherwise competi-
tive markets, taking the structure of economic activities as giv-
en and essentially ignoring the effects of patents on economic 
organization.9 I argue that policy-makers should instead be fo-
cusing on the ways in which patents impact the organization of 
                                                          
ways in which patent laws should be interpreted, applied, and changed in 
light of those objectives. 
 7. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Pa-
tent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1348–90 (2009) (examining the political 
process that shapes patent law change, including the different interest groups 
and their respective abilities to influence patent legislation); Robert W. Hahn, 
The Economics of Patent Protection: Policy Implications from the Literature 6–
14 (Oct. 2003) (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, unpublished 
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=467489 (to access article, 
select One-Click Download). 
 8. As already noted, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act is notable for 
the changes it does not make to the patent system rather than for the changes 
that it does make. 
 9. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 
343–44 (2010) (arguing that much of existing patent law can be explained in 
terms of efforts to provide ex ante incentives to invent, ignoring the problems 
involved with downstream commercialization). The importance of patents as 
tools supporting the organization of innovation is becoming the subject of in-
creasing attention in the patent literature, beginning with the early work of 
Kitch and his prospect theory but expanding beyond to explore other ways in 
which patents shape or hinder the organization of economic activities. Exam-
ples include, without limitation: Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the 
Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory 
of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property 
& Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Ef-
fects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, (2006); Robert P. Merges, 
Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1857 (2000); and Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of 
Organization (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-10, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623565 (to access article, select One-Click Down-
load). 
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innovation processes and the functioning of markets for innova-
tion.10 I suggest that this change in the orientation of patent 
policy is essential in order to improve the relevance of patents 
for innovation policy, and I describe what an alternative organ-
izational approach to the design of patent law might look like. 
The organizational approach to patent law that I describe 
draws from tools and methodologies of New Institutional Eco-
nomics (NIE) that have become influential in reshaping how 
other disciplines, including economics, sociology and history, 
approach the regulation of economic behavior. In particular, my 
approach applies to patent law key insights from Nobel-prize 
winners Oliver E. Williamson on the organization of economic 
behavior in the face of imperfect information and opportunism, 
and Douglass C. North on limited institutional capacities and 
the political economy of institutional change. I argue that Wil-
liamson’s perspective on the regulation of economic behavior in 
the face of bounded rationality and opportunism has particular 
relevance for the analysis of those human arrangements sup-
porting innovation. The problems of imperfect and asymmetric 
information, opportunism, and appropriability that drive Wil-
liamson’s approach are inherent in the process of innovation, as 
amply illustrated by current concerns over the “valley of death” 
for cutting age discoveries and complaints about patent trolling 
and patent hold-up problems as stifling innovation. Williamson 
offers an implementation of these concepts that can be readily 
generalized to patents and economic organization.11 North’s in-
                                                          
 10. Examples of how patents alter the organization of innovation include 
work by Jonathan Barnett on intellectual property as the law of organization. 
See, e.g., Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9. 
Barnett focuses on the role of patents in enabling firms to make efficient deci-
sions about firm scope, facilitating disintegration where there are benefits 
from specialization. Id. This paper pursues the same line of reasoning that 
Barnett offers, but pushes the analysis to a more foundational level. I argue 
that the transactional effects of patent law should be at the center of patent 
policy, and I pursue the implications of this view for the design of patent law. 
Cf. Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stem, Is There a Market for Ideas? (2009) (un-
published working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334882 (to 
access article, select One-Click Download) (examining conditions under which 
a market for technology or ideas will emerge and operate efficiently). 
 11. Indeed, many of the existing applications of NIE to patents borrow 
from Williamson’s approach. See F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intel-
lectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Compe-
tition, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
REGULATING INOVATION 416 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 
2011). See generally Barnett, supra note 9 (focusing on patents as facilitating 
vertical disintegration); Heald, supra note 9 (demonstrating the transaction 
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sights on the limitations of institutional capacity and the politi-
cal economy of rule design are also essential in the design of ef-
fective patent policy.12 Any possibilities for patent law change 
must be examined in light of the characteristics, entrenched in-
terests and past practices of those making and implementing 
patent laws.13 Thus, for example, the competing and comple-
mentary interests of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), Congress and the courts become important 
factors in policy design.14 
Under the organizational approach, transactions, rather 
than inventions, are the basic units of analysis. By making this 
switch in the starting point for analysis, patent policy-makers 
redirect their attention away from individual incentives to in-
vent and towards supporting productive relationships between 
participants in alternative processes of innovation. Innovation 
here is to be construed broadly, including not only invention, 
but also development, new ways of deploying existing technolo-
gies, commercialization, adoption, and use.15 Policy-makers are 
asked to examine patent laws from within the existing system 
of formal and informal rules that determine the cost and feasi-
bility of alternative paths for producing and using innovation. 
Patents can modify this institutional environment by changing 
the decisions that economic actors make about whether and 
how to participate in processes of innovation and markets for 
innovation. Examples include decisions about specialization, 
vertical integration, and the sustainability of different forms of 
cooperation and collaboration.16 This approach can be used to 
move closer to the real world picture of how patents impact be-
                                                          
cost approach). 
 12. See Douglass C. North, New Institutional Economics and Development 
1 (1993) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www2.econ. 
iastate.edu/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf . 
 13. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, 1357–66. 
 14. Jonathan Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 278–79 
(2010) (arguing for institutional solutions to patent performance, advocating 
transfer of substantive rule making authority to the USPTO). 
 15. Christopher T. Hill, The Post-Scientific Society, ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH., Fall 2007, at 79 (argues that the most significant innovations now 
come from the novel organization of economic activity); Robert P. Merges, A 
Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1514–15 
(2005) (argues that property’s “transactional” role is an increasingly important 
part of the economy). 
 16. The existing patent literature includes many examples of how patents 
inform these kinds of decisions. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9. 
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havior in a way that can inform effective rule design.17 
Adopting this way of thinking about patent law can im-
prove policy decisions in significant ways. First, if patent policy 
is specifically designed to respond to flaws in human decision 
making, such as limited information and opportunism, it will 
be more robust in addressing these flaws. By placing decision-
makers at the center of the analysis and recognizing the differ-
ent mechanisms through which rules both influence and are in-
fluenced by human behavior, this approach can identify and 
encompass a broader range of functions for patents, including 
those often overlooked or ignored.18 
Second, the organizational approach focuses specifically on 
how to align patent policy more closely with broader innovation 
goals.19 By providing a commonality of purpose, that of using 
economic organization to increase innovation, this approach 
provides a way of mapping patent policy more readily into the 
areas of concern in national innovation policy.20 For example, 
patent laws can be evaluated to determine whether they facili-
tate or hinder clustering, public-private partnerships, and oth-
er types of arrangements that are the focus of current national 
innovation strategies. Moreover, once the value of patents to 
national innovation objectives can be demonstrated, political 
                                                          
 17. The dangers of including too much, as opposed to too little, context in 
the analysis of legal rules is clear. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 
838–39 (2003) (arguing that the economic analysis of contract law fails be-
cause of its indeterminacy). New Institutional Economics has been relatively 
successful in the development of analytical tools that capture and examine 
empirical regularities, moving between observation and abstraction. 
 18. Examples include transformative effects on potential entrepreneurs 
and expressive functions that reflect and encourage norms of information 
sharing or retention. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 
84 WASH. U. L. Rev. 573, 575–76 (2006). 
 19. Ted Sichelman makes the interesting point that the current system of 
private law damages for patent infringement is inconsistent with a public law 
goal of using patents to increase innovation. He argues that patent law reme-
dies should be designed to promote the types of levels of innovation that are 
most beneficial to society instead of being used to compensate for private 
wrongs inflicted on private parties. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of 
Private Law Remedies, 4–5 (2011) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Ted%20Si
cheman%20%20Purging%20Patent%20Law%20of%20Private%20Law%20Rem
edies.pdf. I also argue that patent law should be designed in light of innova-
tion outcomes, and suggest that one way to do this is to make the organization 
of innovation the central focus of patent policy. 
 20. See Barnett, supra note 9; see also Robert P. Merges, supra note 15, at 
1516. 
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barriers to the integration of patent policy will be easier to 
overcome. 
Third, the approach provides a platform for integrating 
many current patent law theories and related proposals for pa-
tent reform into a form that can lead to more definite policy 
guidelines.21 It offers a starting point for gathering the insights 
that integrating existing work relating to patents and economic 
organization within a single framework can yield. The ap-
proach can be used to integrate and build on seemingly differ-
ent and even conflicting patent law theories which, in some 
cases, are simply different and interrelated aspects of the same 
kinds of behavior. For example, proposals to use patent reform 
to reduce transaction costs need to be examined in connection 
with studies of alternative private market adjustments to avoid 
the same transaction costs and studies which point to different 
types and reasons for transaction costs. Proposals for industry 
tailoring can be evaluated in terms of how closely differences in 
the needs of distinct innovation processes correlate with indus-
try differences.22 This approach also provides a basis for select-
ing among and refining patent reform proposals.23 
Fourth, the organizational approach explicitly takes into 
account the bounded information processing and analytic ca-
pacities of rulemakers, as well as those subject to the rules, and 
incorporates the political economy of rulemaking and enforce-
                                                          
 21. Economist Jaffe concludes that “robust conclusions regarding the em-
pirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy 
are few” because other factors drive innovation. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Pa-
tent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 
RES. POL’Y 531, 531 (2000). Hahn similarly concludes that “[t]he most general 
lesson to be gleaned from the patent literature is that there are few general 
lessons.” Hahn, supra note 7, at ii. This paper lays the groundwork for a larger 
project that involves exploring how different pieces of the literature on patents 
and economic organization can be integrated as part of a broader theory of pa-
tents and the patent system. 
 22. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 156–57 
(2008) (describing industry difference in litigation-based enforcement); Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Policy, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1576–78 (2003). 
 23. See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About 
the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1032 (1998) (sug-
gesting the need to sort out the context of innovation presumed in different 
theories and to map out the empirical domains where the different theories 
are relevant); see also Heald, supra note 9, at 473 (discussing the predominate 
view of patent law in an effort to push beyond it). 
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ment into the design of reform strategies.24 It can be used to 
evaluate divergent opinions on what the process of change 
should look like, in particular whether courts, legislators, or a 
USPTO with expanded lawmaking authority should take a 
leading role in changing the direction of patent law.25 
Part I of this Article explores the limits of the traditional 
law and economics approach to patent law and the implications 
of these limits for current patent policy design. Part II provides 
a brief background on NIE and explains how the tools and 
methodologies of NIE can be used to address the limitations of 
traditional patent law approaches to innovation and patent re-
form.26 Part III describes the proposed organizational approach 
to patent law, outlining the methodology and providing a 
framework to guide its application to the strategic design of pa-
tent law. Under the organizational approach the focal points of 
patent policy design become developing patent laws that are: 
(1) responsive to the needs of alternative innovation processes 
and the different motivations of entrepreneurs; (2) designed to 
reduce the propensity for behaviors which are most costly to 
the organization of economic activities (i.e. those behaviors in-
volving defection from agreed upon norms or rules of behavior); 
and (3) robust to constraints on rule design and implementa-
tion and sensitive to alternative mechanisms for regulating be-
havior. Part IV illustrates how the organizational approach can 
be used to inform the design of patent law in response to con-
temporary challenges facing the current patent system. This 
Article concludes that adopting an organizational approach to 
                                                          
 24. Some reform proposals focus solely on the administration of patent 
law rather than the substance of the rules; they examine the comparative 
strengths and limits of alternative rule making processes. See e.g,. Michael J. 
Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1758–61 (2011) (ex-
amining the problem of patent reform as a problem of effective administration 
and advocating for greater rulemaking authority). 
 25. See, generally, DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS 
AND HOW COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 95–108 (2009); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti 
K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 32–54 (2008). 
 26. See generally, Douglass C. North, A Recommendation on How to Intel-
ligently Approach Emerging Problems in Intellectual Property Systems, 5 REV. 
L. & ECON. 1131 (2009) (discussing the role of NIE in helping to develop a 
more effective, responsive system of regulating innovation). The existing pa-
tent literature includes a number of existing applications of NIE to patent law, 
and one benefit of the organizational approach is its ability to integrate these 
contributions in a way which yields new insights into how patent policy should 
be changed. 
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patent policy is essential in the design of a more effective, and 
relevant, patent system.27 
I. THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND OF TRADITIONAL 
APPROACHES AND WHY THEY MATTER 
The Constitution, from which U.S. patent law derives, pre-
supposes that patents can increase innovation for the public 
good.28 Resting on this foundation, the traditional justification 
for the patent regime in the United States has been largely a 
utilitarian one based on the public goods aspect of invention.29 
Patent policy has been dominated by economic models which 
focus on the incentive effects of creating property rights around 
intangibles within a market-based economy.30 Alternative justi-
fications, including natural rights theories of property, have 
been relegated to the side lines.31 While a number of different 
non-incentive models of patents have been explored, as further 
discussed in Part II, these models have remained relatively iso-
lated and disconnected from mainstream policy agendas.32 Part 
I provides a brief summary of the mainstream approaches and 
highlights the ways in which their limiting assumptions con-
strain effective patent policy design. 
                                                          
 27. This paper provides the methodological foundation for a larger project 
that examines how patents function as tools for organizing innovation. Adopt-
ing an organization based approach to patents and innovation along the lines 
that I suggest here offers a promising way of uncovering how patent policy 
should respond to contemporary changes in the innovation landscape such as 
the increasing volume and complexity of public-private partnerships and other 
forms of collaboration, patent pooling, and standard setting. 
 28. In Article I, Section 8, the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall 
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 29. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
1600book.pdf (noting the dominance of the principal theoretical theory of utili-
tarianism in justifying protection of technical inventions). 
 30. Kieff, supra note 9, 398–406 (summarizing the conventional majority 
view on intellectual property regimes). 
 31. But see E. Richard Gold, The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional 
Competence, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 263, 265–267 (2003) (arguing that 
there is an increasing strain of libertarian theory in U.S. patent law, with its 
roots in natural rights). 
 32. E.g., Heald, supra note 9 (discussing non-incentive based models of 
patents and providing a non-incentive based justification for patents). 
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A. MAINSTREAM THEORIES OF PATENTS 
The dominant theory underlying much of today’s patent 
law and policy is the “reward theory” of patenting.33 At its most 
basic, this theory explains that patents provide necessary in-
centives for invention by allowing inventors to appropriate the 
returns from their efforts at the cost of restricting use of the re-
sulting inventions.34 The “reward theory” is supplemented by 
the “disclosure theory” of patenting, which suggests that by 
providing property rights in discoveries to inventors, patents 
will allow inventors to disclose their information without fear 
that the benefits of the information will be appropriated.35 
Recognizing the importance of downstream investments in 
exploiting new inventions, a second main branch of theories 
has focused on the functions of patents in providing incentives 
for the development and commercialization of inventions. This 
branch includes Edmund W. Kitch’s well known “prospect theo-
ry,” which examines the role of broad, strong patent property 
rights in ensuring efficient investment in and management of 
downstream innovation.36 Other approaches focus more specifi-
cally on the need to induce the development and commerciali-
zation of early stage inventions where much of the investment 
and problems of appropriability occur after the initial discovery 
has taken place and are undertaken by different organiza-
tions.37 
These mainstream theories of patents diverge in their con-
cern for upstream investment versus downstream development 
of the invention, and in the types of market failure that justify 
the need for patent rights. But they share a similar starting 
                                                          
 33. Kieff, supra note 9, at 398–406. 
 34. Without patents—or so the incentive theory of patents goes—either 
the invention would be kept as a trade secret, limiting access to the idea, or 
others would be able to freely copy and use the inventions at lower cost, result-
ing in an under-supply of inventions and follow on innovation. 
 35. According to Kieff, conventional views of patents are largely based on 
three dominant incentive theories of IP: (1) some version of the “incentive to 
invent” and “disclose” theories treated together under the rubric of “reward,” 
(2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory. Kieff, supra 
note 9, at 398–406; see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of 
Science, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989) (discussing alternative theo-
ries). 
 36. For further explanation of the prospect theory, see Edmund Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Ac-
cording to prospect theory, strong patent rights protect the incentives of the 
invention owner to make investments that maximize the value of the patent. 
 37. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 23, at 1040. 
6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 2:20 PM 
222 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
point based on an abstract and relatively homogenous market-
based paradigm of invention populated by rational actors who 
produce invention products. Moreover, the focus remains on 
whether monopoly via patent rights is required to address 
market failure due to appropriability, uncertainty, or increas-
ing returns to scale,38 and whether it is required at the point of 
invention or in the subsequent path of development and com-
mercialization.39 This shared foundation and the assumptions 
on which it rests have important consequences for the current 
approach to patent policy. One of the main results is a neglect 
of the importance that organization plays in innovation out-
comes. 
B. SHARED LIMITATIONS OF THE MAINSTREAM THEORIES 
Three shared assumptions inherent in traditional ap-
proaches to patent law account for their limited ability to ex-
plain when and how patents influence innovation in reality: (1) 
reliance on a simplified world of rational actors; (2) use of per-
fect competition as a benchmark against which to evaluate pol-
icy alternatives; and (3) reliance on an abstract, mass market 
production model of innovation. 
1. The Simplified Story of Market Failure in a World of 
Rational Actors 
Traditional theories of patents operate in a world of com-
petitive markets and rational actors, allowing their proponents 
to stick to relatively narrow market failure stories of invention 
in input and product markets.40 While these theories rely on 
stories about how patents change the behavior of inventors, re-
strictive assumptions of perfect rationality assume away char-
acteristics of human decision-makers that affect how patents 
                                                          
 38. See KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION (1959), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P1856.pdf. 
 39. See e.g., Ted M. Sichelman, Markets for Patent Scope, 1 IP THEORY 42 
(2010) (arguing that divergent views of patent scope can be explained in terms 
of divergent views about how well markets for R&D and commercialization 
work). 
 40. Arrow argues that there are three main sources of market failure in 
the competitive market paradigm, increasing returns to scale, 
inappropriability, and uncertainty, and that all three are present in markets 
for information. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF 
RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, supra note 38, at 10. 
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might actually alter behavior. In doing so, they largely ignore 
the different mechanisms by which patents may alter behavior 
in the production and use of innovation.41 
2. Perfect Competition as a Benchmark 
A second limitation is the benchmark used by traditional 
theories for evaluating rule change. In evaluating the impact of 
patents, a model of perfect competition serves as the bench-
mark against which other forms of market activity can be com-
pared and the efficiency costs of departure from perfect compe-
tition identified. This use of a perfect world as a benchmark for 
comparing alternative policies limits the scope for incremental 
improvement and excludes considerations of feasibility in policy 
design. As Ronald Coase warns, 
[c]ontemplation of an optimal system may . . . provide techniques of 
analysis that would otherwise have been missed. . . . But in general 
its influence has been pernicious. It has directed economists’ attention 
away from the main question, which is how alternative arrangements 
will actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive conclu-
sions for economic policy from a study of an abstract model of a mar-
ket situation. . . . Until we realize that we are choosing between social 
arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to 
make much headway.42 
Recent efforts to look at patent law in the context of imper-
fect competition move in the right direction,43 but it is clear 
that a more comprehensive shift in the benchmarks used for 
comparing policy choices is needed. Part of this shift should in-
                                                          
 41. See, e.g., James Anton & Dennis Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: 
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190 
(1994) (examining the role of patents in enabling trade in technological infor-
mation); Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Inno-
vation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 237, 238 (1985) (“[B]y protecting property rights, pa-
tents here open the market for trade in technological information.”); Robert P. 
Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost 
of Commercial Exchange, 93 MICH. L. REV.1570, 1590–91 (1995) (discussing 
how IP rights can reduce transaction costs). 
 42. Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. 
REV. 194, 195 (1964). 
 43. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface 
(U. Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-46, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 (to access article, select One-Click Down-
load) (stressing the importance of evaluating IP laws within specific market 
contexts); Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW J. 
L. & TRADE AM. 237 (2007) (arguing for the importance of evaluating rules 
such as private property orderings within their market context and using dif-
ferent forms of regulation to ensure the competition needed to make the rules 
effective). 
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clude incorporating limits in the process for effecting legal 
change, since the goal should be to compare feasible policy op-
tions. 
3. Homogenous Processes of Innovation 
Mainstream theories of patent law generally presume a 
paradigm of innovation based on a uniform “innovation produc-
tion” process driven by rational actors responding to market in-
centives. This view of innovation, what one scholar has termed 
a “mass market seller-based” paradigm of innovation, flows 
naturally from the neoclassical market-based approach to pa-
tents and shares its limitations.44 It leaves no room for differ-
ences in the processes by which innovation may take place, the 
nature and implications of the resulting innovations, and the 
different stages of development in the innovation life cycle.45 As 
a result, very different types of economic activities and ar-
rangements are lumped together.46 The means and the process-
es of innovation are often collapsed with the end, the resulting 
innovation and its effects.47 Inventive efforts are viewed as fun-
gible, and the benefits of the incentives provided by patents are 
characterized primarily in terms of increased innovation out-
put.48 There is no room in such an approach for puzzling over 
how to respond to the problems that asymmetric information, 
bounded rationality, and opportunism pose for coordinating the 
activities that together result in innovation. 
In sum, mainstream theories fail to explore how patents 
impact economic behavior in contexts that adequately reflect 
                                                          
 44. Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the 
Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 895 (2009) (sug-
gesting a new approach to international patent law to address different modes 
of innovation such as user innovation and open and collaborative innovation 
practices). 
 45. See ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF 
RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, supra note 38; WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, 
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 93–115 (1969). 
 46. Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2257, 2260 (2010) (“Innovation occupies a central place in intellectual property 
legal scholarship. As much as it is relished and pursued, however, it is almost 
never critically explored.”). 
 47. See Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the 
Impact of Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y, 135, 143–48 
(2004). 
 48. Cf. Strandburg, supra note 44, at 881. 
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the characteristics and needs of systems of innovation and core 
attributes of the human decision-makers who shape them.49 
While recognizing that some level of abstraction from reality is 
inevitable, and even essential in policy design, mainstream ap-
proaches ignore too many critical aspects of the complex activi-
ties that drive innovation and the actors who engage in them. 
As a result, mainstream theories provide inadequate guidance 
for environments characterized by rapidly changing technolo-
gies and complex and diverse paradigms of innovation.50 The 
limitations of the traditional approaches to patent law have 
been reflected in the limited and mixed results produced by the 
empirical literature seeking to quantify the effects of patents on 
innovation and economic growth.51 This lack of definitive em-
pirical results can be attributed, at least in part, to the lack of 
richer models of innovation in patent law and the correspond-
ing paucity of variables connecting changes in patent law with 
changes in economic behavior.52 
While the broader law and economics literature points out 
other, non-incentive based functions that patents might play, 
including communication and signaling functions,53 coordina-
tion functions,54 and accounting functions,55 such functions 
have not been adequately incorporated into mainstream ap-
proaches for analyzing patents and innovation. I argue that one 
of the reasons for this is the absence of a general methodology 
                                                          
 49. See e.g., ARTI RAI, STUART GRAHAM & MARK DOMS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC 
GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 3–5 (2010), available at 
http://2001-2009.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/@opa/documents/con 
tent/prod01_009147.pdf. 
 50. See Kappos Testimony, supra note 1, at 8 (advocating for patent re-
form in the face of unprecedented technological change and static patent 
laws). 
 51. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 531 (demonstrating that empirical literature is 
inconclusive on whether stronger patents increase or decrease innovation); see 
also Hahn, supra note 9, at 2 (concluding that the economics literature yields 
few general lessons for patents). 
 52. See e.g., Michelle Gittelman, A Note on the Value of Patents as Indica-
tors of Innovation: Implications for Management Research, 22 ACAD. MGMT. 
PERSP., Aug. 2008, at 26. 
 53. Patents might be used to signal the value of intangible assets by firms 
seeking financing, for example. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 625 (2002) (exploring the signaling role of patents and arguing that pa-
tents allow disclosure of R&D capacity and value of human capital to attract 
investment and licensing opportunities). 
 54. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 9, at 398–406. 
 55. Heald, supra note 9. 
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for examining the systemic effects of patents on processes of 
innovation.56 The existing literature has remained largely pe-
ripheral to core decisions about patent law and policy as a re-
sult of its fragmented nature and challenges in operationalizing 
many of the insights that it contains, with a resulting loss in 
opportunities for more effective policy design.57 
In this paper I am proposing an approach that does not 
dismiss, but rather builds on the traditional law and economics 
approaches to patent law. It takes the existing neoclassical-
based framework and relaxes key assumptions about rational 
actors, perfect competition, and costless transactions to ac-
commodate the institutional environments in which innovation 
takes place. In Parts II and III, I suggest that it is possible to 
relax these assumptions and incorporate the context of innova-
tion in a way that is still tractable and susceptible to modeling 
and testing. By allowing for a more contextualized analysis of 
how innovation takes place, the approach makes it easier to 
identify and act upon opportunities for improving innovation 
outcomes through patent law change. By providing a theoreti-
cal framework grounded in the analysis of transactions, the ap-
proach provides for analytical tractability. 
II. EXPANDING BOUNDARIES THROUGH NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
NIE has been used to explain the evolution of and opportu-
nities for improvement in our current systems of regulating in-
teractions between economic actors in a growing number of ar-
eas, most particularly that of economic development. In this 
Part, I explore how NIE methodologies can address the chal-
lenges of effective patent policy design.58 I begin with a descrip-
tion of the core concepts underlying NIE, and I then focus spe-
cifically on the contributions made by Williamson and North 
                                                          
 56. As an example, the role of patents as devices for signaling firm value 
may arise initially due to asymmetric information, but may become more sig-
nificant as norms of venture capital investment emerge. Patents may, over 
time, become a proxy for more difficult calculations of value in early stage fi-
nancing. Models which focus on only one mechanism—such as an incomplete 
contract story or a business norm story—give us an incomplete picture of what 
patents are doing. 
 57. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 23, at 1036–38. 
 58. See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 72 (1998). 
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and explain how these contributions are particularly useful in 
formulating an alternative methodology for patent law design. 
A. CORE CONCEPTS OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
NIE is best understood as a research movement that pro-
vides a new way of analyzing economic phenomena built 
around a set of shared beliefs, or principles, about how to study 
economic behavior and performance.59 It encompasses different 
methodologies and areas of focus. NIE scholars build on, modi-
fy, and extend neoclassical economic theory to provide a central 
role for “institutions,” which can be variously understood as 
“the humanly devised constraints that structure human inter-
action.”60 or the “prescriptions that humans use to organize all 
forms of repetitive and structured interactions.”61 They incor-
porate the roles of formal rules—such as property rights and 
patent rights—and informal rules—such as norms of sharing 
information, their governance, organizations, and the multiple 
dimensions, motivations, and limitations of human actors in 
order to explain economic phenomena.62 They see economic ac-
tivities as being embedded within an institutional framework, 
and the central purposes of NIE include explaining the deter-
minants of institutions and their evolution over time and eval-
uating their impact on economic performance.63 Differences in 
economic systems are explored and explained in light of their 
institutions and institutional environment. Coase, Williamson, 
                                                          
 59. Paul L. Joskow, Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report 
Card, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 1, 3 (Éric Brousseau 
& Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2008). 
 60. Douglass C. North, Washington University, Prize Lecture for the 
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel: 
Economic Performance Through Time, Part II (Dec. 9, 1993), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/northlecture.html. 
 61. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 13 
(2005). Ostrom’s work focuses on the use of collective action, trust and cooper-
ation in managing common pool resources. 
 62. Claude Ménard, Methodological Issues in New Institutional Econom-
ics, 8 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 85, 86 (2001) (examining the methodological 
challenges that face NIE, including moving from the analysis of transaction 
costs to the dynamics of innovation); Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Eco-
nomics 3 (1998) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=115811 (to access article, select One-Click Download) 
(providing an overview of NIE). 
 63. See Ronald H. Coase, University of Chicago, Prize Lecture for the 
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel: The 
Institutional Structure of Production (Dec. 9, 1991), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coaselecture.html. 
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and North are considered to be the founders of NIE, and their 
work informs our understanding of the core concepts of NIE. 
The focus of NIE, to the extent there is a single focus for a 
loosely grouped set of analytical approaches, is on coordination 
of economic activities through formal and informal rules, and 
on the alternative governance structures within an institution-
al environment that are a product of political, historical, eco-
nomic and social forces.64 Property rights and patent rights are 
formal institutions designed to describe the boundaries of, and 
allocate control rights over, the disposition and use of re-
sources. Formal rules interact with informal rules, such as 
norms and customs regarding fairness and business attitudes, 
to create the “institutional environment,” or set of background 
constraints, that guide transactions. 65 North draws an analogy 
between the institutional environment and the rules of a game, 
with institutions defining and limiting the set of choices avail-
able to individuals.66 Individuals or individual entities enter in-
to agreements to govern their specific relationships in light of 
the background rules.67 These arrangements are often referred 
to as governance structures, and include the use of contracts 
and different types of public and private bureaucracy as alter-
native ways to organize economic activities.68 Governance in-
volves the interaction of public and private orderings; public 
ordering can be viewed as the “rules of the game,” while private 
ordering can be viewed as the “play of the game.”69 Organiza-
tions can be understood as groups of people and the arrange-
ments those people create to coordinate their collective actions, 
and include firms, government entities, universities, families, 
                                                          
 64. NIE provides multiple methodologies for studying economic behavior, 
including a combination of mathematical modeling, case studies, econometric 
modeling, and experiments to test alternative theories. See Joskow, supra note 
59, at xxxix-xli (exploring the methodologies of NIE). NIE encompasses diverse 
work on transaction costs, agency costs, property rights, incomplete contracts, 
social costs, collective action, and hierarchy and organization. See, e.g., Brian 
Dollery, New Institutional Economics and the Analysis of the Public Sector, 18 
REV. POL’Y RES. 185 passim (2001). 
 65. See North, supra note 60. 
 66. Id. at Part III. 
 67. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
4–5 (1996). 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 5. 
 69. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 
AM. ECON. REV. 438, 438 (2002). 
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and other collective structures.70 Organizations are not only 
players in the game, but are also involved in shaping and 
changing the rules of the game; “[i]t is the interaction between 
institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional 
evolution of an economy.”71 
As an example of what these terms mean in practice, the 
Bayh-Dole Act changed the rules regarding ownership of inven-
tions developed using public funding, allowing universities and 
other research entities to elect title to patents obtained for such 
inventions—a change in the rules of the game.72 As a result, 
universities and other research entities began to work in new 
ways with industry partners, including licensing arrangements 
and other forms of collaboration previously unavailable—a 
change in governance, or how the game is played.73 The effects 
of this rule change took place within an institutional environ-
ment that has modified the behavioral responses to the rule 
change in ways that are still being explored.74 
B. WILLIAMSON’S METHODOLOGY 
While much of the work done in NIE takes the form of a 
particular theoretical and/or methodological approach to eco-
nomic behavior, Williamson is one of the few to offer both a 
broad analytical framework for studying the organization of 
economic activity and a way of operationalizing his conceptual 
framework.75 Williamson provides a system-based approach to 
the study of economic activity, anchoring individual transac-
tions within a social, legal, economic, and political context.76 Al-
ternative mechanisms for coordinating economic activity are 
examined in the face of bounded rationality, opportunism, and 
                                                          
 70. See Joskow, supra note 59, at 5–6 (discussing the core principles of the 
NIE research approach). 
 71. North, Economic Performance through Time, supra note 60, at Part 
III. 
 72. See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 202–212 (2006). 
 73. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and 
the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003) (emphasizing that while it is 
clear that licensing has an effect on university technology transfers, more re-
search is needed to fully understand the impacts licensing brings to the re-
search environment).  
 74. See id. (explaining that though licensing by universities has increased 
dramatically, the effects on the research environment are unclear). 
 75. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 595, 595–96 (2000). 
 76. See id. at 596–97. 
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the vulnerabilities that arise in exchange transactions.77 At the 
core of his approach is the notion that we can best understand 
economic activity through an analysis of the organizational 
structures, or institutions, by which exchange under conditions 
of scarcity takes place.78 Transactions, rather than composite 
goods and services, are seen as the fundamental unit of analy-
sis.79 These transactions occur in settings that limit trading 
partners and trade opportunities based on existing relation-
ships, knowledge, sunk investments, and other aspects of asset 
specificity.80 Multiple dimensions of transactions are studied, 
thus connecting very different theories of human behavior and 
its determinants.81 I argue that the problems Williamson 
struggles with help to illuminate the problems that patent poli-
cy-makers should be struggling with. His insights are critical in 
understanding when and why governance matters in processes 
of innovation. 
Given the importance of human actions and decisions in 
the process of innovation, a core part of the analysis of patents 
and innovation must include the study of human attributes 
that are likely to influence both types and levels of innovative 
activity as well as downstream use of new innovations (e.g. 
through adoption of new technologies, or changes in prefer-
ences towards new goods). Simon, one of the pioneers in the 
study of the decision making process within economic organiza-
tions, makes reference to two key attributes of human actors: 
their cognitive ability and self-interestedness.82 Williamson re-
flects these attributes in his own way through concepts of 
                                                          
 77. See id. at 600–01. 
 78. See id. at 595–96. The term “New Institutional Economics” was origi-
nated by Williamson, and its best known representatives are Williamson, 
North, and Coase. Coase, supra note 58, at 72. 
 79. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 67, at 6–7. 
 80. Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction 
Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 626 (2010). 
 81. WILLIAMSON, supra note 67, at 6–7. 
 82. Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psy-
chology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 303 (1985) (stressing 
that policy-makers should be prepared to address the key attributes of human 
actors in fashioning theories that depend on particular views of human deci-
sion making); see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Eco-
nomics, 59 J. BUS. S209, S223–S224 (1986); Oliver E. Williamson, Human Ac-
tors and Economic Organization, 6–8 (Università degli Studi di Siena, 
Working Paper No. 247, 1999), available at ; North, Economic Performance 
through Time, supra note 60, at Part II. 
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bounded rationality, transaction costs, and uncertainty.83 As he 
describes, “[a]ttributes of human actors that bear crucially on 
the lens of contract/governance are cognition, self-interest, and 
foresight (where the last can be considered an extension upon 
cognition).”84 Human actors act with bounded rationality, 
meaning that they respond rationally in the face of imperfect 
information and the need to economize in making decisions–
they attempt “rationally to cope.”85 They act with self-interest, 
meaning that routine activities occur in a spirit of cooperation 
give way to a more calculative orientation as the stakes for de-
fection increase.86 The capacity for “feasible foresight” allows 
parties to limit some of the negative effects of this opportunism 
by constructing mechanisms that allow for credible commit-
ments to behave cooperatively.87 
To operationalize this transaction cost approach, William-
son emphasizes a focus on specific phenomena, such as the par-
adigmatic NIE problem of vertical integration.88 “The transac-
tion is made the basic unit of analysis, and is thereafter 
dimensionalized (with emphasis on asset specificity, contractu-
al disturbances (uncertainty), and frequency).”89 The focus is 
economizing on transaction costs through the alignment of 
transactions and their different attributes with governance 
structures, which diverge in their cost and competence.90 The 
framework is one of contracting, and the results are susceptible 
to empirical testing.91 This methodology provides an important 
departure from the traditional approaches to patent theory de-
scribed in Part I; it is seeking to build a contextualized under-
standing of behavior out of a collection of observations that 
form the basis for modeling and testing, rather than starting 
with a general theory that relies on empirical support based on 
limited data such as research and development (R&D) spending 
and patents filed. 
                                                          
 83. See Williamson, supra note 82, at 3–5. 
 84. Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction 9 
(Econ. Discussion Papers, No. 2007-3, 2007) available at 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-3 (to ac-
cess article, select download PDF). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 9–10. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 16. 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. Id. at 12. 
 91. Id. at 17–18. 
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C. NORTH AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS 
North begins from a very different vantage point, and with 
different objectives in mind. He looks at different national 
economies as a whole, and explores differences in their paths of 
economic development and opportunities that they may have 
for changing their adaptive efficiency as new conditions arise.92 
He focuses on the political economy of rule design and imple-
mentation, exposing the various limits of existing decision mak-
ing structures and the influence of politics, unequal bargaining 
power, and ideologies on institutional change.93 North’s work 
suggests the need to integrate the limitations of institutional 
capacity into the analysis of rule design.94 It is not just those 
subject to the rules, but also those designing and implementing 
the rules who are subject to bounded rationality and opportun-
ism; there is no implication that the resulting institutions are 
efficient.95 Instead, ideas and ideologies play important roles in 
shaping institutions and in limiting possibilities for change.96 
This suggests a second best approach to policy making, in 
which patent laws are selecting not only for their impact on or-
ganizational structure, but also for their robustness to special 
interests and to errors in implementation.97 Thus, the emphasis 
in the organizational approach is on rule-making in a second 
best world. 
                                                          
 92. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 102–08 
(1991). 
 93. See id. at 108–11. 
 94. See Douglas C. North, New Institutional Economics and Development 
1 (1993) (Working Paper), available at http://www2.econ.iastate.edu 
/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 7–8. 
 97. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, at 1341–42; Mark A. Lemley, Can 
the Patent Office Be Fixed? 1–3 (Stanford L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 396, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1668203 (to access article, select 
One-Click Download); cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Legal Process 
and the Discovery of Better Policies for Fostering Innovation and Growth 1–5 
(Ill. Program in L., Behavior, and Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. LBSS11–06, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739312 (to access article, select 
One-Click Download) (suggesting that jurisdictional choice principles could 
effectively address issues of special interest capture of policy through market 
principles). 
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D. USING NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS TO REORIENT PATENT 
POLICY 
The questions asked by NIE scholars, including work done 
on incomplete contracts, decisions about vertical integration, 
and theories of the firm, arise with particular force in the con-
text of situations where intellectual property rules come into 
play.98 NIE theories explore the impact of alternative rules, 
particularly property rights, in addressing the challenges of co-
ordination, such as reducing information costs, increasing cer-
tainty in transactions, reducing the costs of bargaining and ex-
change, preventing free riding, and controlling negative 
externalities.99 There is a growing body of theoretical and ap-
plied work in the patent literature suggesting that patent 
rights, along with other formal rules, play important roles in 
determining the existing structures within which innovation 
occurs and the performance of these structures.100 Applied 
                                                          
 98. See Burk, supra note 9, at 3 (“In a so-called information age, where 
the most important assets of firms increasingly are intangible assets, one 
might expect that property-based theories of the firm would be readily applied 
to intellectual property.”); Kieff, supra note 9, at 330 (“The tools NIE uses to 
conduct comparative institutional analyses have played a central role in the 
scholarly debate within property theory about the shifts that occur over time 
among property regimes. . . . [But] the basic case for or against formal proper-
ty rights for IP backed up by property rules has largely escaped the attention 
of the NIE literature.”) (footnote omitted); Merges, supra note 9, at 1877 
(2000) (“Property rights, firms, institutions, governments: all of these are the 
subject of extensive study by social scientists operating within the [New Insti-
tutional Economics] framework. It is time to integrate the study of IPRs into 
this framework.”). 
 99. The NIE research agenda is focused on how institutions (such as the 
laws governing property rights) matter and how they change over time. See 
e.g., Coase, supra note 58. 
 100. For important work at the intersection of patents and NIE see Anton 
& Yao, supra note 41, at 190–192 (analyzing the ability of independent inven-
tors to negotiate with firms in the absence of patent protection); Barnett, Intel-
lectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9, at 3; Jonathan M. 
Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innova-
tion Markets 1 (Univ. S. Cal. Center in Law, Econ., & Org. Research Paper No. 
C08–22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287283 (to access arti-
cle, select One-Click Download) (explaining that sharing of intellectual proper-
ty can lower transaction costs, but requires a framework to operate within);  
Burk, supra note 9, at 3 (2004) (examining intellectual property laws in light 
of theories of the firm); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intel-
lectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 37–39 (2004) (drawing analogies be-
tween IP and public utility regulation, and revisiting Coase’s critique of pro-
posals for public subsidies to reduce costs to marginal cost in the context of 
IP); Gallini & Winter, supra note 41, at 238 (exploring the role of patents in 
opening markets for trade in technological innovation); Paul J. Heald, Trans-
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work, including both historical studies of specific inventions 
and markets, such as the study of the steam engine, and case 
studies of specific markets or industries, such as the semi-
conductor industry, enrich the contextual framework for study-
ing the intersection of patents and economic behavior.101  High-
er level theories based on specific applications of NIE tools play 
an important role in identifying specific functions that patents 
might play in facilitating or reducing the cost of innovation ac-
tivities.102 Such functions include reducing transaction costs, 
facilitating the transfer of information, and allowing parties to 
coordinate their actions.103 A third body of relevant work dis-
                                                          
action Costs and Patent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 447, 448 (2007) (arguing that effects on transaction costs need to be stud-
ied carefully in any attempt at patent reform); Kieff, supra note 9, at 328–30 
(focusing on the link between property rule treatment and coordination); Mark 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (arguing that ex post justifications for the exist-
ence of intellectual property are misleading); Clarisa Long, Information Costs 
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 471 (2004) (examining the rela-
tionship and implications of intellectual property and information costs); 
Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost 
of Commercial Exchange, supra note 41, at 1590–91 (discussing how intellec-
tual property rights lower transaction costs); Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, supra note 9. For a study of spe-
cific innovation structures addressing key issues relevant to patent policy de-
sign, see, for example, Carliss Y. Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Par-
adigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative 
Innovation 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 10–803,2009), available 
at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/ 10-038.pdf (arguing that collaborative in-
novation and innovation by individuals both need to be addressed by policy-
makers). This list is illustrative of the general trends in this area and is not 
meant to be exhaustive. 
 101. Examples of historical studies include: Christine MacLeod & Ales-
sandro Nuvolari, Patents and Industrialization: An Historical Overview of the 
British Case, 1624–1907, at 2–3 (Laboratory Econ. & Mgmt., Working Paper 
Series 2010), available at http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2010-04.pdf 
(examining the historical connection between patents and industrialization); 
Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revo-
lution: the Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 347, 
349 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of collective invention, rather than 
intellectual property rights, in the invention of the steam engine). Examples of 
case studies include: Peter C. Grindley & David Teece, Managing Intellectual 
Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39, 
Vol. 2 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1997). 
 102. For mid-level theories, see Barnett, supra note 9, at 1 (allowing for 
more efficient specialization economies); Heald, supra note 9 (discussing 
transaction cost-reducing functions of patent law); Kieff, supra note 9, at 345–
46 (explaining the coordination function of intellectual property).  
 103. See, e.g., Anton & Yao, supra note 41, at 190–192; Barnett, supra note 
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cusses the political economy of the patent system and its impli-
cations for patent reform.104 
These different approaches demonstrate the potential that 
the analytical tools of NIE have to shed light on new aspects of 
patent law, but the literature lacks a foundation that can con-
nect specific empirical studies and the insights of theoretical 
models to each other and to more comprehensive models of in-
novation.105 The absence of such a foundation has limited the 
reach of NIE to influence patent policy. A key objective in de-
veloping a methodology and framework for thinking about pa-
tents and the organization of innovation is to promote the inte-
gration of existing results and the connection of these results 
with both the real life systems within which different kinds of 
innovation take place and the legislative, administrative, and 
judicial systems that determine the directions of patent law. 
Applying the insights from this literature to inform patent poli-
cy, the central inquiry for patent policymakers becomes one of 
determining what roles patents play in structuring, facilitating, 
or impeding desired processes of innovation.106 
                                                          
100, at 1; Barnett, supra note 9, at 3; Baldwin & Hippel, supra note 100 Burk, 
supra note 9, at 3; Duffy, supra note 100; Gallini & Winter, supra note 41, at 
238; Heald, supra note 9, Kieff, supra note 9, at 328–30; Lemley, supra note 
100, Long, supra note 100; Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New 
Institutional Economics, supra note 9; Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the 
Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost of Commercial Exchange, supra note 
41, at 1590–91. 
 104. See, e.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7 (advocating for an analysis of 
the patent system’s political economy in order to fully understand patent re-
form); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach 
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003) (exploring 
the importance of institutional design for patent policy). 
 105. See W. Patrick McCray, Re-Thinking Innovation: A New Agenda for 
Academic Investigation, SCI. PROGRESS (May 14, 2010), 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2010/05/re-thinking-innovation (discussing the 
disconnected analysis of innovation and the need for a middle ground that 
makes extrapolation to real world innovation possible). 
 106. For examples of efforts made in this direction see Brett Frischmann, 
Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 
(2009–2010) (arguing that regulating the effects of the externalities-producing 
patent system requires an understanding of the varied institutions in which 
patents operate); see also Brett Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2143 (2008–2009) (explaining that changes in patent law are shifting 
the university research system to a more commercial orientation); Arti K. Rai, 
The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation, 
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
173, 180 (2001) (arguing that genomic advances could reduce drug develop-
ment costs enough to scale back pharmaceutical patent protection); Barnett, 
Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9, at 3–4 (arguing 
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III. A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO PATENT 
LAW 
I advocate an organizational approach to patents that is 
based on the premises that: (1) the organization of economic ac-
tivity is an important determinant of innovation outcomes; (2) 
patents play a role in determining the organization of innova-
tion; and (3) patent laws should be designed to support the op-
eration and evolution of diverse socially beneficial processes of 
innovation.107 The approach offers a way of implementing the 
insight that patents should be studied and evaluated in terms 
of their impact on processes of innovation, viewed in terms of 
transactional structures occurring within a particular institu-
tional context. The first step in patent policy design is to char-
acterize existing or potential desired transactional structures of 
innovation and the institutional environment within which 
they occur, and the second step is to explore the roles that pa-
tents play in the cost and feasibility of these structures. Oppor-
tunities for policy design involve relating conditions of innova-
tion to design features of patent law within a given 
institutional context.108 
A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Several basic principles emerge from this perspective on 
patent policy to guide the design of patent law. 
1. Support Systems of Innovation, Not Acts of Invention 
Patent law should ultimately be about improving the per-
formance of systems of innovation, not incentivizing acts of in-
vention. Therefore, patents should be studied and evaluated in 
terms of their impact on processes of innovation. The character-
                                                          
that patent rights create more efficient organizational forms). 
 107. The existing literature supports the view that patents can play an im-
portant role in shaping the transactional structure of production. See, e.g., 
Barnett, supra note 9, Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual 
Boundaries, supra note 106, Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, supra note 106, 
Arti K. Rai, supra note 106. The question of whether markets will select the 
most efficient paths of innovation or whether regulators should play a role in 
favoring one mode of innovation over another is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The organizational approach can accommodate both views. Indeed, the ap-
proach suggests that paths of innovation will be the product of some combina-
tion of public and private ordering. 
 108. See, e.g., Ménard, Methodological Issues in New Institutional Econom-
ics, supra note 62, at 86–87. 
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istics of the innovation process and the institutional environ-
ment within which these activities occur provide the contextual 
framework within which patent rights are examined and de-
sign opportunities identified. This approach readily encom-
passes innovation from different sources, including not only 
producers but also public actors and user driven innovation. It 
also encompasses the entire process of innovation, from inven-
tion, design, and development, through to adoption and use.109 
2. Focus on Transactions as the Basic Units of Analysis 
In order to understand how patents and other forms of 
regulation impact the organization of innovation we need to ex-
amine the transactional structures underlying different pro-
cesses of innovation within their institutional context. Innova-
tion can be understood as a process of creating something new 
and of value to a particular community.110 It is driven by hu-
man agents acting with self-interest and imperfect information, 
and it is shaped by the types of arrangements or transactions 
that they engage in with each other to exploit opportunities to 
benefit from exchange.111 Patents, along with other institu-
tions, are viewed as “humanly devised constraints that struc-
ture [perhaps imperfectly] political, economic and social inter-
action” in processes of innovation.112 Patent laws and the 
systems of governance which enforce them influence the feasi-
bility and cost of alternative ways of organizing human activi-
ties relevant to innovation.113 
3. Respond to the Existing Institutional Environment and the 
Limits of Individual Decision Making 
Patent law must be designed in light of the limitations on 
decision-makers and imperfections in the existing institutional 
environment. The assumption of rational actors with full in-
                                                          
 109. See, e.g., Brian Kahin, Beyond the Box: Innovation Policy in an Inno-
vation-Driven Economy, SCI. PROGRESS (July 13, 2009), http://www.science 
progress.org/2009/07beyond-the-box (exploring the understanding of innova-
tion underlying government efforts such as the American COMPETES Act of 
2007). 
 110. Cf. McCray, supra note 105. 
 111. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, supra note 75, at 600–01. 
 112. North, supra note 92, at 97. 
 113. See Barnett, supra note 9, Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Con-
ceptual Boundaries, supra note 106; Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, supra 
note 106; Rai, supra note 106. 
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formation is replaced with presumptions of bounded rationality 
that reflect the limited capacity people have to obtain and pro-
cess information in most situations.114 Instrumental rationality 
is rejected (at least in part) and choices are instead based on 
mental models informed by values, norms, and experiences.115 
Bounded rationality provides opportunities for opportunistic 
behavior in the face of incomplete contracts and imperfect con-
tractual enforcement, and creates transactions costs in the co-
ordination of economic activities.116 It is because of these imper-
fections that institutions and alternative modes of organizing 
economic activities become important; in the absence of these 
imperfections all activities could be conducted through market 
exchange and the use of enforceable contracts.117 Property 
rights and their interpretation become important because they 
necessitate and structure transactions and influence transac-
tion costs as a part of the functioning of such markets.118 Per-
fect market benchmarks are replaced with comparisons of al-
ternative outcomes in imperfect markets. As F. Scott Kieff 
explains: 
NIE emphasizes the use of comparative institutional analysis to look 
at the different characteristics of institutions and what impact they 
have on individuals and organizations over time. Such an approach 
means we should ask not only what we want to achieve, but also 
which mix of formal and informal institutions will work better in 
achieving our set of goals.119 
                                                          
 114. The concept of bounded rationality is attributed to Herbert Simon. See 
also Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, supra note 75, at 600–01; Douglass C. North, The New Institutional 
Economics and Development at 1 (Wash. U. Working Paper, 1992), available at 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf (“What [NIE] abandons is 
instrumental rationality—the assumption of neoclassical economics that has 
made it an institution-free theory.”). 
 115. See Douglas C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third 
World Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 20–21 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995); see also North, 
supra note 114; Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–01. 
 116. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–01. 
 117. These same limitations apply to the institutions themselves, as North 
points out, resulting in the persistence of imperfect institutions, and the need 
for pragmatic approaches to policy design. North, supra note 115, at 17–18, 
24–26. 
 118. See Heald, supra note 100; Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: 
Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange, supra note 41, at 
1590–91; Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in 
Innovation Markets, supra note 100. 
 119. Kieff, supra note 9, at 339. 
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This emphasis becomes particularly important when eval-
uating the opportunities that patent laws offer as policy levers 
in improving economic outcomes in imperfectly competitive 
markets that are subject to other forms of public and private 
orderings.120 
4. Seek Robustness to the Political Economy of Rule Making 
and Engage in a Comparative Analysis of Alternative Rules 
The political economy of rule design and the comparative 
analysis of alternative regulatory strategies within a given con-
text are important parts of policy analysis. Those designing and 
implementing the rules are themselves subject to the limita-
tions of bounded rationality and opportunism.121 Institutions 
will inevitably be imperfect, and opportunities for change will 
be constrained by path dependence and influenced by ideas and 
ideologies.122 The design and enforcement of patent laws are 
both shaped by the social, cultural, and political structures in 
which systems of innovation are embedded, and by cognitive 
processes such as ideologies regarding ownership and attitudes 
towards risk.123 Alternative forms of regulation are evaluated 
in light of the existing institutional environment and the con-
straints operating on processes of rule change and adoption.124 
In evaluating institutions such as patent laws and how 
they change, the organizational approach retains the methodo-
logical individualism inherent in traditional neoclassical-based 
approaches.125 Institutions such as patent laws are understood 
as “systems of rules created to offset uncertainty and risk by 
providing a social structure that allows humans to gain certain 
                                                          
 120. See Coase, supra note 42, at 195. See also Nancy T. Gallini & Susan 
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, 2 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 71–72 (2002) (asserting that private contract-
ing can alter conclusions about optimal patent design and public and private 
instruments and this may be complementary in reducing social costs). 
 121. See North, supra note 115, at 17–18, 23. 
 122. See North, supra note 92, at 97–98, 109–110. 
 123. See North, supra note 115, at 18–20. 
 124. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 601. 
 125. NIE does not escape the limitations of methodological individualism. 
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics 46–
47(Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 9–78, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518836 (to access article, select One-Click Down-
load) (arguing that continuing methodological individualism limits under-
standing of institutions). In addition methodological individualism, may not 
adequately capture certain instrumental goals of patent law, such as goals 
that are based on natural rights. 
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control over their environment.”126 They emerge as a result of 
cumulative individual choices that are continually reshaped by 
human beliefs and decisions.127 Institutional contexts are seen 
as the collective result of institutions, or systems of rules, that 
emerge through individual choices.128 
In developing contextual models of economic activity, NIE 
draws liberally from many other disciplines, including law, his-
tory, organization theory, cognitive science, political science, 
sociology, and anthropology.129 This encompassing approach is 
necessitated by the recognition that rules and the governance 
structures which enforce them are the imperfect, context de-
pendent products of human actors, operating with limited cog-
nitive competence in various historical, cultural, economic, and 
social contexts.130 The use of a contextual framework encour-
ages multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary methods of anal-
ysis that are much needed in patent policy.131 Innovation sys-
tems are influenced by overlapping and constantly evolving 
institutions from a variety of different fields, including science, 
politics and law.132 Policy-makers must understand these dif-
ferent institutions and their interactions. Moreover, they must 
consider institutional structures to bridge the cultural gaps, 
and to facilitate the flow of information between entities in-
volved in rule development and enforcement, as well as the 
need to develop formal procedures for learning as part of the 
efficient evolution of institutions.133 
                                                          
 126. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).; Claude Ménard, Markets as Institutions 
Versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts, 
28 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG.161, 164–67 (1995). 
 127. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 598. 
 128. See Klein, supra note 62, at 3–7. 
 129. See id. at 1. 
 130. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–04; see also North, supra note 
114, at 7. 
 131. See Natalia Boliari & Kudret Topyan, Conceptualizing Institutions 
and Organizations: A Critical Approach, 5 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 1, 2–4 (2007), 
available at http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JBER/article/view/2507/ 
2553. 
 132. Id. 
 133. The costs of failing to achieve an effective integration of law and sci-
ence are illustrated by a recent study of the criminal and scientific investiga-
tions that followed the United States anthrax scare in 2001. See Erin Murphy 
& David Sklansky, Science, Suspects, and Systems: Lessons from the Anthrax 
Investigation, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art. 3, 1–2 (2009). 
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B. FRAMEWORK FOR CHARACTERIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
According to the organizational approach, patents are one 
of many institutions that, together with governance structures, 
characterize the institutional environment within which trans-
actions take place.134 The institutional environment consists of 
five interconnected levels of social analysis which constrain be-
havior. These levels are: (1) “cognition,” or individual patterns 
of decision making under uncertainty, (2) “informal rules,” or 
“embedded institutions,” including the formation and effect of 
norms, values and conventions that shape the context of inno-
vation, such as those governing the “production” of science and 
technological advance, and those influencing and constraining 
the evolution and effects of patent laws; (3) “formal rules,” or 
the “institutional environment,” the direct constraints on deci-
sion making, including patent rights and other formal rules 
relevant to processes of innovation; (4) “governance structures,” 
or “institutional arrangements,” such as firms, different market 
structures, government, and hybrid forms of collaboration; and 
(5) “institutions of resource allocation,” such as marginal 
changes in activity levels in response to stronger or weaker pa-
tent rights.135 Opportunities for policy intervention occur at dif-
ferent levels of the framework. Interaction occurs between the 
different levels.136 In some cases the interactions may strength-
en the effectiveness of a policy change, but in other cases they 
may inhibit it. The framework provides a way of structuring 
the analysis that a policy maker would engage in when choos-
ing between alternative patent laws, such as presumptive ver-
sus limited availability of injunctions against patent infringers, 
based on likelihood of achieving desired innovation objectives.  
  
                                                          
 134. Williamson provides an analytical framework for examining changes 
in economic behavior that emphasizes the interaction between four levels of 
social analysis and the differential rates of change at different levels, and I 
adapt this framework to the needs of patent law. Williamson, The New Institu-
tional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, supra note 75, at 595–600; 
Williamson, Human Actors and Economic Organization, supra note 82, at 1–4, 
34–35. 
 135. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 595–600. 
 136. These five layers of analysis are adapted from Williamson’s four levels 
of social analysis to fit the needs of patent law. Williamson’s four levels of 
analysis are embeddedness, the institutional environment, governance, and 
resource allocation. See id. 
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The alternative rules would be situated within the framework 
and then examined in light of connections with higher and low-
er levels of institutional constraints. 
1. Cognition 
This level of analysis looks at the mental models that gov-
ern individual behavior, and the intersection of the mental 
models with formal and informal rules.137 Areas of particular 
relevance to innovation include the relationship between cogni-
tive processes and formal and informal institutions in shaping 
decision making under uncertainty. The combination of ideolo-
gy, understood as a shared set of mental models possessed by 
groups of individuals, and institutions may help agents to cope 
with complex decision making under conditions of uncertainty, 
for example.138 Gaining a better understanding of how actors in 
processes of innovation respond to different kinds and magni-
tudes of uncertainty could help policymakers assess the rela-
tive costs associated with alternative types of uncertainty cre-
ated by patent law.139 Ideologies may influence the 
effectiveness of patents at motivating or deterring certain kinds 
of behavior. The relationship between patents and beliefs about 
autonomy, for example, may inform the ways in which people 
respond to them, both as developers and users of inventions.140 
People may be predisposed to behave in ways that support cer-
tain forms of cooperative production, and patents may operate 
either to support or to interfere with cooperative outcomes. Ide-
ologies may also play an important role in the political-
economic framework for understanding the nature and limits of 
existing institutions and the potential for positive change.141 
                                                          
 137. Williamson describes this as an “evolutionary level in which the 
mechanisms of the mind take place.” Id. at 600. 
 138. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideo-
logies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3, 3–4 (1994) (defining ideology, institu-
tions, and mental models, and describing their interactions with one another). 
 139. See, e.g., Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of 
Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from 
Patent Grant Delays, J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 1–3 (2006) (considering the im-
pact of the IP system on the timing of cooperation and licensing by start-up 
technology entrepreneurs); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 6– 
11 (discussing the importance of clear boundaries in patent law). 
 140. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–8 
(2011) (discusses importance of non-utilitarian principles in justifying pa-
tents). 
 141. See North, Institutions, supra note 93, at 109–111; DOUGLASS C. 
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Incorporating the cognitive level into the institutional en-
vironment provides an opportunity to explore both the im-
portance of mental models in constraining behavior relevant to 
innovation, such as risk taking, and potential avenues for re-
sponding to these limitations through, for example, patent law 
change.142 Experimental economics, behavioral economics, and 
experimental psychology may provide underutilized avenues 
for exploring these aspects of human learning and decision 
making and their implications for the design of patent laws.143 
2. Embedded Institutions (Informal Rules) 
Informal rules include the norms, values, customs, and 
conventions that shape behavior relevant to systems of innova-
tion.144 For example, they include both informal rules that in-
fluence how science and technology are “produced” and result-
ing innovations developed and deployed,145 and informal rules 
that influence the evolution of patent laws and their effective-
ness. Policy analysis under the organizational approach re-
quires the study of the different aspects of the embeddedness of 
innovation—whether cultural, structural, or political—and the 
implications that the embeddedness has for patent policy.146 In-
formal rules depend on existing political, social, and cognitive 
                                                          
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
85–86 (1990). 
 142. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600. 
 143. Experimental psychology and behavioral economics may provide in-
sights into how individuals respond to different risk-reward systems as well as 
on transformational aspects of creating ownership over intangibles. E.g., An-
drew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 140–42 (2009) (discussing the use of games 
and simulations to investigate how actors respond to various patent situa-
tions). 
 144. See Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it 
is Headed, 146 DE ECONOMIST 23, 26–29 (1998). 
 145. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW 
SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 15–17 (1987) (offering a con-
tested approach to the empirical study of science and technology which em-
phasizes that science and technology must be studied “in the making,” and 
looking at the social construction of science through the study of laboratory 
processes and systems). While many may disagree with Latour’s view of the 
social construction of science, he offers a useful perspective on the different 
types of formal and informal rules that together channel economic activity. 
 146. Williamson, supra note 75, at 597. See e.g. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellec-
tual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1443–47 (2010) (offering 
an example of the importance of embedded analysis in the context of evaluat-
ing open systems of innovation). 
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structures for change and thus “deliberate choice of a calcula-
tive kind is minimally implicated.”147 Since change at this level 
is slower and more difficult to control than change in subse-
quent levels, it is often neglected when exploring policy op-
tions.148 But the constraints that informal rules place on oppor-
tunities for effective rule change are a critical part of the policy 
making equation.149 
Examining the interaction of patent laws, which are formal 
rules, with relevant informal rules requires attention to those 
features of the scientific and technological environments that 
are relevant to the production and sharing of knowledge. Dif-
ferent types of innovation processes may be organized around 
very different norms governing the production and use of 
knowledge, norms which are often in tension with patent 
rights. Efforts to understand this intersection have begun at 
the university level, where tensions arise between traditional 
academic norms of information sharing and the pull of commer-
cial interests from licensing opportunities and industry collabo-
rations.150 Cross-country studies reveal the role of culture and 
social norms in determining the effectiveness of formal rules 
such as intellectual property laws.151 Cross-generational behav-
ior is informative in exploring the power of informal norms in 
shaping behavior, even in the face of contradictory formal rules, 
particularly as new technologies and patterns of use emerge 
that clash with rules designed for very different technologies.152 
                                                          
 147. Williamson, supra note 144, at 27. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. 21–
22, 32–34 (explaining that a complex system of norms has developed to deal 
with the deficiencies in patent law in many industries, making change to the 
law difficult). 
 150. See, e.g., Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes 
for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001) 
(possible loss in quality of research); Jerry Thursby and Marie Thursby, Policy 
Forum, Where is the New Science in Corporate R&D, 314 SCI. 1547 (2006) 
(frictions created by bargaining over IP); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the 
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Ar-
rived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004). 
 151. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of 
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 
(2001) (discussion in the context of copyright law that raises issues with appli-
cation to patent law in the international context); John F. Duffy, Harmony and 
Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002). 
 152. The use of file sharing technologies like Napster provides a good ex-
ample. See NAPSTER, http://napster.com (last visited October 12, 2011). 
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Although mostly factors at this level are seen as constraints on 
formal rule change, formal rules can play a role in altering the 
context of innovation. Patents might alter not only the produc-
tion of scientific discoveries, for example, but also the way in 
which science is understood.153 Patents might also have a 
transformative effect. 
3. Institutional Environment (Formal Rules) 
This level includes both the evolution and application of 
patent rights and other formal rules relevant to innovation. 
The patent policy opportunities at this level involve making 
changes to patent rights to achieve desired objectives in light of 
the existing transactional structures of innovation.154 Much of 
the NIE patent literature starts here, with questions about the 
roles of patent “property” rights in creating possibilities for ex-
change.155 These branches of the literature have roots in 
Coase’s work on the importance of property rights in the pres-
ence of externalities,156 with much of the work centering on the 
definition and enforcement of patent rights, and their intersec-
tion with contract laws.157 Using the transaction as the basic 
                                                          
 153. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in 
Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 662 (2004) (Examines the contribution 
of patents to the advancement of scientific theory—”the scientific community’s 
conceptual understanding of the basic structure and properties of natural 
phenomena.”). 
 154. This framework shares Williamson’s assumption that while recogniz-
ing that legal constructs such as the patent system are the product of evolu-
tionary processes and “constrained by the shadow of the past,” the legal sys-
tem nevertheless provides design opportunities. Williamson, supra note 75, at 
598. 
 155. See, e.g., MERGES, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transaction: 
The Case of Patent Pools, in INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS: NOVEL CLAIMS TO 
PROTECTION AND THEIR BOUNDARIES 5 (2001) (“Property rights are important 
because they necessitate and structure transactions.”); John F. Duffy, Rethink-
ing the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). Merges ex-
amines the intersection of property rights and contract and suggests two ma-
jor contributions that property rights make to real world contracting—pre-
contractual liability and enforcement flexibility. See also Merges, supra note 
15. 
 156. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) 
(explaining the importance of property rights in the presence of transaction 
costs); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783–85 (1972) (explain-
ing the emergence of the firm in terms of information costs and looking at the 
impact of alternative allocations of property rights on problems inherent in 
team production). 
 157. See Williamson, supra note 75. 
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unit of analysis, alternative forms and allocations of patent 
property rights are compared in terms of their effects on ex 
ante incentives and the cost and feasibility of resulting produc-
tion decisions.158 Attention is paid, for example, to how patents 
enable the collection of information and property rights from 
different rights holders in the process of production.159 Alt-
hough patent rights diverge from property rights in some re-
spects, they are often analyzed primarily as property rights in 
invention, leading to questions about how well patents perform 
as property rights within the given administrative system for 
awarding and enforcing them.160 
Theories of incomplete contracts, team production, and 
other property-based theories of patents explore different as-
pects of patents and their roles in structuring transactions, 
with direct implications for patent law. Paul Heald suggests, 
for example, that patents lower transaction costs by facilitating 
affirmative asset partitioning (shielding assets from creditors 
and heirs of the investors in a firm) and addressing problems 
arising from team production such as shirking and other oppor-
tunistic behavior by team members (reducing the cost of fenc-
ing and monitoring), through the establishment of a title regis-
tration system for the patentable information.161 Pursuant to 
this theory, we need to pay particular attention to how the title 
registration system is working.162 Scott Kieff suggests that en-
forcing patent rights as property rights will support positive 
forms of coordination needed for commercialization through a 
beacon effect (drawing together complementary users) and a 
bargain effect (facilitating the ability of multiple users to nego-
tiate with each other).163 Pursuant to this theory, treating pa-
tents as property rights will facilitate commercialization. 
                                                          
 158. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 155 (examining the emergence of intel-
lectual property rights exchange institutions and the integration of institu-
tions into existing theory). 
 159. Barnett, supra note 9, at 39–41 (demonstrating that weaker patent 
rights may increase the cost and reduce the opportunities for decentralized 
production by increasing the risks of disclosing the information that is imper-
fectly protected). 
 160. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing the extent to 
which patent rights are property rights). 
 161. See Heald, supra note 9, at 476–77. 
 162. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 51–55 (arguing for im-
provements to the title registration system). 
 163. See Kieff, supra note 9, at 333–34. 
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The “new property rights” literature centers around the 
idea that property rights become important where contracts are 
incomplete or otherwise difficult to enforce, either because of 
unforeseen contingencies, costs of writing contracts, or costs of 
enforcement.164 In these cases, as illustrated by pioneers of the 
approach such as Oliver Hart, ownership of the underlying as-
sets becomes critical in determining the level of investment in 
and the allocation of benefits from the assets.165 This incom-
plete contracting approach has been usefully applied to explain 
observed patterns of ownership over patents, such as why firms 
contracting for research and development services might assign 
resulting patent rights to the firm providing the services.166 
Critical questions for contemporary patent policy include how 
patents can be used to address challenges of team production 
and collaboration between different organizations, particularly 
public-private partnerships.167 
The organizational approach provides a theoretical under-
pinning for many property rights-based proposals for patent re-
form, as described further in Part IV, by explaining when and 
why the predictability and allocation of property rights over in-
ventions matters. It also anchors competing models, including 
those based on incomplete contracts, property rights, and 
transaction costs, in a larger framework that can accommodate 
                                                          
 164. See discussion of new property rights in Merges, supra note 15, at 
1484–85 (discussing that the New Property Rights approach was pioneered by 
Oliver Hart, Sanford J. Grossman, and John Moore). See generally Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986); Oliver Hart 
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
1119, 1121–25 (1990) (assessing the different costs of transactions carried out 
within a firm and those carried out through the market). 
 165. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 132–35 (1999); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: 
Where Do We Stand? 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 743–44 (1999) (examining how 
incomplete contracts literature can help us to understand economic phenome-
na such as the patent system, and taking stock of the strengths and limits of 
the literature). 
 166. See Merges, supra note 15, at 1484–85, for discussion of the New 
Property Rights approach and other examples. See also Ashish Arora & Robert 
P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 
13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 460–70 (2004); Philippe Aghion & Jean 
Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1185, 1189–97 (1994). 
 167. See e.g., ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, Commodifying Collaborative Research, 
in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, (Neil Netanel & Neva 
Elkin Koran, eds., 2002) (examines challenges that commodification of ideas 
via patent rights creates for collaborative projects and the need to refine pa-
tent laws to address increasingly team based discovery). 
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the different mechanisms through which rules change behavior 
and compare alternative ways of achieving the same behavior. 
4. Institutional Arrangements (Governance Structures) 
While policy discussions on patent reform seem to be fo-
cused primarily on refinements to the formal rules through at-
tention to issues of definition and enforcement of patent rights, 
many of the problems with the current patent system instead 
involve activities at the intersection of formal rules and gov-
ernance structures. Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on 
challenges of organization in the face of uncertainty, opportun-
ism and bounded rationality this intersection is where most of 
the current work on patents and NIE is located.168 
Governance concerns “the play of the game” through public 
and private orderings such as through contract, government fi-
at, or internalization within the firm. At their most basic level, 
governance structures can be characterized as alternative 
mechanisms for decision making and enforcement.169 Analysis 
at this level involves: (a) uncovering the structure of transac-
tions and the characteristics of alternative governance struc-
tures; and then (b) seeking to align transactions with govern-
ance structures in a way that promotes desired outcomes.170 
This mechanism incorporates organizational responses to ex 
post incentive problems such as costs and other limits on en-
forcement of rules. Exploring the ways in which activities are 
organized in light of existing formal rules and why, is a central 
part of this level of analysis.171 Starting with the simplest 
transaction, autonomous transacting via the market, we con-
sider reasons for why this type of governance structure might 
be unavailable, what alternative structures might address the 
                                                          
 168. Burk points to theories of the firm as underutilized tools for examin-
ing intellectual property law. Burk, supra note 9 (describing the major trans-
action costs that delineate the boundaries of the firm as coordination and 
agency costs). 
 169. Williamson, supra note 75, at 599. 
 170. Id. at 598–599. 
 171. Key questions at this level include: How do patents influence the costs 
associated with alternative governance structures? Do patents allow for cer-
tain ways of organizing activities that might otherwise be unavailable (e.g. al-
lowing for decentralization)? Can a change in patent rights reduce the costs 
associated with a particular way of organizing innovation activities? Might 
patent rights impede certain types of organizational structures? 
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problems, and at what cost.172 More generally, governance 
structures can be compared in terms of multiple distinctive at-
tributes—markets have very different attributes than direct 
regulation.173 These attributes will impact the cost and feasibil-
ity of transactions.174 Policy design includes examining the 
alignment of governance structure with transactional structure 
to produce desirable outcomes. Examples of policy strategies 
include reallocating transactions across alternative governance 
structures to reduce transaction costs—perhaps by increasing 
or decreasing the level of integration within a firm versus use 
of the market.175 The literature on vertical integration and the-
ories of the firm play an important role here.176 
Analysis includes not only public governance structures 
such as governments, courts, and agencies such as the USPTO 
and the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), 
but also private systems of contracting and enforcement such 
as markets, firms, and other forms of collaboration such as pa-
tent pools.177 North’s focus on the political economy of rulemak-
ing reminds us that implementation of the rules will inevitably 
be imperfect and costly, that alternative governance structures 
will alter how the rules impact incentives and the structure of 
transactions, and that many activities will occur through pri-
                                                          
 172. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 603 (“We thus begin with autono-
mous contracting, which is the ideal transaction in both law and economics: 
‘sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance.’” (quoting Ian R. 
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 738 (1974))). 
 173. Id. at 599. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. E.g., Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure and 
Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 459–60 
(1982); Dan. L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Bal-
ancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 575; Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, supra note 15; 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, and the Value of Intangi-
ble Assets (1999) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/iprights.pdf; David J. Teece, Firm Organiza-
tion, Industrial Structure and Technological Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 193 (1986). 
 177. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 
1293 (1996) (surveying the diverse institutions various industries have culti-
vated to handle intellectual property transactions, and arguing that repeat 
players can and do come up with private solutions to overcome transactional 
bottlenecks). 
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vate rather than public ordering.178 The current debate over the 
role of regulators in limiting the royalty rates and other terms 
of private standard setting organizations provides a nice illus-
tration of the debate over public versus private ordering.179 Op-
portunities also arise for experimentation with new types of 
governance structures better adapted to the needs of particular 
transactions—such as different ways of separating ownership 
and control and new forms of public-private partnerships 
adapted to address particular kinds of market failures.180 
5. Institutions of Resource Allocation and Employment 
Much of the traditional study of patent law and innovation 
has taken place at this level, the continuous adjustment of 
market participants to price and quantity signals as they opti-
mize objective functions—production functions, typically, in the 
context of firms. This level encompasses the study of how 
changes in marginal conditions such as patent scope and patent 
term length or the expected value of a resulting invention-
product will alter decisions about activity levels in the produc-
tion and use of inventions.181 The tools of optimization theory 
provide useful avenues for exploring market adjustments in re-
sponse to changes in rules or their enforcement.182 However, 
the decision-makers are operating subject to bounded rationali-
ty, and their allocation choices are constrained by the combina-
tion of rules and their mechanisms for enforcement. Under-
standing in more detail how markets adjust, and the costs 
associated with such adjustments, is a critical missing link 
both in enriching traditional optimization models, and in deep-
                                                          
 178. See Williamson, Human Actors and Economic Organization, 
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA 3 (1999) (It.) (citing Douglass C. North, 
Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 7 (1984)). 
 179. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, & Daniel F. Spulber, The 
FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming Mar. 2012). 
 180. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Opening the Black Box of In-
novation, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 701, 703–08 (1994) (describing the R&D process 
as including creators, financiers, owners, and users of the invention and 
endogenizing the governance of R&D and distribution of investments, patent 
rights, and profits among the actors to explore organization of R&D). 
 181. Williamson, supra note 75, at 597. 
 182. See, e.g., Arthur B. Treadway, Adjustment Costs and Variable Inputs 
in the Theory of the Competitive Firm, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 329 (1970) (discuss-
ing the economic affects adjustment costs have on competition). 
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ening transaction cost theories of patent law.183 An important 
related area of empirical work lies in finding ways to identify 
and measure transaction costs, including a comparison of 
transaction costs relating to innovation activities in the pres-
ence and absence of patents. 
6. Putting the Levels Together 
Taken together, these levels and the interaction between 
them can be used to characterize the institutional environment 
within which different policy parameters can be studied, and 
this provides a framework within which policy choices can be 
evaluated and compared. The figure below provides an illustra-



















                                                          
 183. See Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Pa-
tent Reform, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521137 (to access article, select One-Click Down-
load); see also Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Coopera-
tion in Innovation Markets, supra note 100 (discussing the role of private mar-
kets in shaping the limits on patent rights); Merges, supra note 15. 
 184. See Eva Lieberherr, Policy Relevance of New Institutional Economics? 
Assessing Efficiency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 5–7 (Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne, Working Paper No. 0906, 2009), available at 
http://mir.epfl.ch/files/content/sites/mir/files/users/181931/public/wp0906.pdf, 
for a further discussion of these levels. 
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Figure 1: Characterizing The Institutional Environment 
Adapted from Williamson185 
Layers Objectives Pace of 
Change 




Influence risk taking, entrepreneur-




 Limited opportunity for regulation
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Institutions 
Limited opportunity for regulation Very slow 
Informal rules such as norms, 
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Importance of norms and norm 
building 





Get institutional environment right 
(changing the rules) 
Moderate 
Formal rules: rules of the game. 
Examples: patent rights, property 
rights 
Opportunities for policy intervention 




Get governance structure right 
(changing governance structure) 
Moderate 
Governance structure: play of the 
game. Example: vertical integra-
tion 
Opportunities for policy intervention 
relating to choice and function of  
governance structures 
↓ ↑ 
Institutions of  
Resource Allocation
Get marginal conditions right Rapid 
 Opportunities for intervention: tradi-
tional demand and supply strategies, 
regulation directed at incentives and 
market failure 
 
For the policy-maker, several important points emerge 
from this framework. First, the layers are interconnected. 
Changes made at any layer will influence the effect of other in-
stitutions. For example, formal rules may determine what 
types of governance structures are feasible. The effectiveness of 
changes may also be muted by other layers. For example, a rule 
                                                          
 185. Williamson, supra note 144, at 26. 
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change designed to alter the ease of challenging a patent will 
have little effect if there are factors at the first level of analysis 
that constrain patent challenges, or if there are factors at the 
third level that make enforcement prohibitively expensive. The 
interaction between the mechanisms and the availability of 
multiple policy levers also suggests the need for policy coordi-
nation. For example, USPTO strategies for changing the rela-
tionship between the agency and patent applicants to encour-
age higher quality submissions need to be examined alongside 
proposed legislative changes, such as rules governing inequita-
ble conduct. A formal rule change may have no effect on behav-
ior if the behavior is controlled by strong norms that point in 
the other direction. Second, the relative importance of different 
layers for achieving desired changes in economic behavior will 
vary depending on the characteristics of the behavior and the 
specific institutional context in which it takes place. Changing 
risk-taking behavior or beliefs about entrepreneurial ability 
may be most heavily influenced by efforts at cognitive change 
and a change in norms, whereas increasing the ability of com-
panies to specialize may be primarily a matter of the interac-
tion of formal rule change with governance structures. Third, 
the policy tools and the opportunities for change vary signifi-
cantly by level, with little scope for change at layer one and an 
opportunity for rapid and potentially significant change at lay-
er five. Empirical studies are needed to determine which mech-
anisms predominate in different types of economic behaviors 
and thus, which policy variables are most likely to be effective. 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
This Part illustrates how the organizational approach 
works as a guide for patent law change through some examples 
that highlight areas in which the patent system is underper-
forming. 
A. MAKING PATENT POLICY RELEVANT TO NATIONAL 
INNOVATION POLICY 
Organizational innovation works in combination with 
technological innovation, and as technologies change, so do the 
organizations which develop and use these technologies.186 The 
                                                          
 186. Chandler’s work on the emergence of new organizational forms points 
to the importance of organizational innovation working in tandem with tech-
nological innovation. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND 
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organizational approach to patent law evaluates patents in 
terms of their ability to support efficient forms of economic or-
ganization. This includes responding to changing modes of or-
ganizing innovation. Pursuant to this approach, patent policy-
makers are asked to start with the goal of facilitating alterna-
tive processes of innovation, and to investigate what roles pa-
tents are or might play in determining the cost and feasibility 
of these alternative processes.187 As already discussed, the or-
ganization of economic activities plays an important part in 
Obama’s National Innovation Strategy. By focusing on objec-
tives that are driving the U.S. national innovation strategy, 
and by explaining how patents can help to achieve these objec-
tives, patent policy can play a more central and effective role in 
innovation policy.188 Not only will it be easier to integrate pa-
tent policy into broader decision making about innovation, but 
it will also be harder to justify political barriers which keep pa-
tent policy decision-makers out of the discussion.189 
Consider, for example, the role of patent policy as part of 
President Obama’s energy innovation strategy. One key result 
of the National Innovation Strategy and the policy initiatives it 
has prompted is increased government spending, particularly 
in key sectors such as clean energy and health technologies.190 
                                                          
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 309–
15 (MASS. INST. OF TECH. ED., 1962). 
 187. Inroads in connecting patents to the structure of innovation have al-
ready been made. Merges, for example, examines the development of hybrid 
institutions formed to address transaction cost and valuation problems inher-
ent in the reallocation of intellectual property rights that are necessary to cre-
ate workable markets. See Merges, supra note 177 (applying NIE to case stud-
ies of performing rights societies, patent pools, and the Hollywood Script 
Registry in order to examine the institutional innovations that are designed to 
address challenges of creating collective rights mechanisms). Barnett exam-
ines whether markets will select intellectual property regimes most conducive 
to innovation. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation 
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384 (2009). Murray and 
Huang discuss the potential for policy experiments in funding innovation. See 
Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Entrepreneurial Experiments in Sci-
ence Policy: Analyzing the Human Genome Project, 39 RES. POL’Y 567 (2010). 
 188. Rai has been arguing for a coordinated innovation policy. Benjamin & 
Rai, supra note 25. 
 189. The absence of patents in national innovation strategies could be ac-
counted for in political economy terms. Recognizing patents as critical tools of 
innovation would require a shift in authority and resources that many in the 
current government structure would be reluctant to make. 
 190. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 28 (2010) (discussing clean energy economy); NAT’L 
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In addition to increased funding, the USPTO implemented a pi-
lot program for green technologies that is designed to expedite 
the processing of patent applications relating to clean ener-
gies.191 A simple incentive-based approach to patent law would 
suggest that increased funding of private sector R&D and fast-
er processing of patents would together increase the speed and 
volume of development and deployment of green technologies. 
Applying the organizational approach, however, shifts the 
starting point of analysis to alternative ways of organizing ef-
forts to develop and deploy green technologies.192 Transactions, 
such as the agreements between private parties in a patent 
pool or contracting arrangements between research entities 
and industry partners, are the units of analysis; the effects of 
alternative patent laws on the cost and feasibility of different 
transactions are examined. Using this approach, the effective-
ness of the USPTO program is evaluated in light of the most 
promising models of innovation, including attention to patent 
pools and patent commons.193 When viewed from this perspec-
tive, increasing the speed and likelihood of patenting might 
hinder rather than enhance these relationships. In addition, 
the ways in which public funding is provided and the owner-
ship of publicly funded inventions need to be considered. Exist-
ing NIE work points to the importance of examining incentives 
of public and private actors in light of default ownership 
                                                          
ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2 (identifying clean energies as one of the sectors 
identified for intervention). 
 191. Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified Oct. 5, 
2011); see, e.g., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., WHITE HOUSE ENERGY 
INNOVATION CONFERENCE: SUMMARY REPORT 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.energyinnovationnetwork.org/en/~/media/Files/WH_summary_rep
ort.ashx (This report discusses the White House energy innovation agenda, 
which includes the USPTO pilot program to expedite processing of patent ap-
plications covering clean energy technologies under the assumption that 
“[p]roviding innovators with more timely patent protection will help bring 
technologies to market more quickly.”). 
 192. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (calling for $190 billion to develop clean energy technologies). 
 193. See alternative models for sharing innovation such as the Eco-Patent 
Commons established by IBM, Sony, Nokia, and Pitney Bowes. See Eco-Patent 
Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
http://www.wbcsd.org/web/epc (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). Alternative models 
also can be found at the GreenXchange hosted by Creative Commons. See Pa-
tent Licenses, SCI. COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/patent-
licenses (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). 
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rules.194 It provides the tools to explore how a changing balance 
of public and private activity may alter innovation processes.195 
Getting the balance of public and private ownership right 
might be critical to supporting organizational innovation and 
preserving both private sector incentives and widespread ac-
cess to fundamental discoveries.196 
Another key finding from national innovation studies is the 
need for public involvement in the formation of “clusters” or 
“networks” of innovation, including universities, private labora-
tories, and access to funding and other forms of support for new 
businesses.197 If regional industry clustering is the goal, we ex-
amine whether stronger or weaker patent rights support this 
clustering. We know already that patents allow for more decen-
tralized forms of production and may enhance certain kinds of 
information sharing.198 Where there is a more pervasive role for 
public actors as not only funders but also consumers and users 
of innovation, we examine the costs and benefits of the existing 
                                                          
 194. See generally Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The 
Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 101 (2010) (exemplifying various public incentives and economic theories 
at play in the antibiotic market, and the impact this has on pharmaceutical 
innovation and development). 
 195. See, e.g., Sean O’Connor, Controlling the Means of Innovation: The 
Centrality of Private Ordering Arrangements for Innovators and Entrepre-
neurs, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH (Robert Litan ed., 
2011). 
 196. Kevin Outterson offers an interesting example of the importance of 
the structure of the innovation process in his study of antibiotics. See Kevin 
Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance 
in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2010). He shows that 
strengthening patent rights in the market for antibiotics may lead to overuse 
of antibiotics, with significant consequences for antibiotic resistance and in-
centives to develop new antibiotics. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as 
Part of A Full TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2009); 
see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 190, at 22 (including a dis-
cussion of a shift towards cluster policies in innovation); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION FY 2011 BUDGET REQUEST TO CONGRESS, at 
Overview-4 (2010), available at http://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/ 
fy2011/pdf/FY%202011%20Budget%20Request%20to%20Congress.pdf (dis-
cussing the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) plan to invest $12 million to 
promote new “NSF Innovation Ecosystems” with support for regional innova-
tion clusters around universities to increase the impact of innovation through 
commercialization, industry alliances, and start-up formation). 
 198. See generally Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1651–55 (explaining the 
benefits that a decentralized model will have for patent law). 
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allocation of ownership rights provided by patent laws such as 
the Bayh-Dole Act, with its allocation of ownership rights to 
private research institutions.199 The one specific effort to ad-
dress the increase in collaborative research and development in 
patent law may have created more problems than it solved be-
cause it failed to address the underlying structural challenges 
of different kinds of collaboration. This effort, the Cooperative 
Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, 
sought to foster collaborations between public and private ac-
tors by allowing exchanges of information in a way that in-
creased the ability of each party to patent the results.200 While 
seemingly a benefit to public-private partnerships, a failure to 
consider the transactional structures of university-private 
company negotiations and the scope for opportunistic behavior 
by private parties resulted in rules that could systematically 
disadvantage the university partners.201 
B. TAILORING THE CASE FOR TAILORING 
The U.S. patent statute creates a set of rules of general ap-
plicability which are to be applied to provide technology-neutral 
protection to any inventions that satisfy the legal standards 
prescribed.202 This fits well with traditional approaches to pa-
tents and invention, with their abstraction from the processes 
of innovation. The one-size-fits-all approach is increasingly at 
odds, however, with evidence that patents perform differently 
in different market and non-market contexts. Additionally, pa-
tent law has not yielded the hoped for flexibility in addressing 
                                                          
 199. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology In-
novation Act of 1980 reflect U.S. patent law efforts to facilitate innovation in 
contexts of government-funded research, by non-government research entities. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). The effectiveness of these 
laws is still under debate. See F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent 
Policy Reform in the United States 18 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working 
Paper No. RWP07-042, 2007) (suggesting alternatives to the current patent 
law regime). 
 200. The Act expands the universe of information that will not be consid-
ered prior art when seeking patent protection for the fruits of the collabora-
tion. See, e.g., Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–453, 118 Stat. 3596 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)) 
(protects information shared as part of a collaboration from being considered 
prior art for patenting purposes); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 200 
(2006) (providing for ownership over inventions developed using federal fund-
ing). 
 201. See Vertinsky, supra note 183, at 68. 
 202. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1576. 
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changing technological and business needs.203 Patents are seen 
as working well in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, 
for example, and poorly in the software and other related high 
tech industries.204 They are seen as working well in privately 
funded, purely commercial projects and less well in areas of re-
search receiving significant public support.205 Patents covering 
single products are less worrying than patents covering plat-
form technologies used in producing multiple goods. Patents 
may serve functions early in the development process but fail to 
address the challenges of commercialization.206 
Many commentators have advocated a tailored approach to 
patent law, through the policy levers available to courts, tools 
available to the USPTO, or through legislative efforts.207 Pro-
posals that have been prominent in the patent literature in-
clude the recommendations made by Dan L. Burk and Mark A. 
Lemley in “The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve It.” 
Burk and Lemley make the argument that patent law should 
be, and in practice often is, tailored to specific industries and 
technologies, based on the argument that different industries 
innovate differently.208 To the extent that industry differences 
align with characteristics of different processes for innovation, 
and alternative forms of tailoring are not feasible, industry tai-
loring may be an appropriate guide for policymakers. Opportu-
                                                          
 203. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09. 
 204. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09; Burk & Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Policy, supra note 22, at 1675–95. 
 205. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation?: The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); 
Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Nec-
essary Incetive or Double Subsidy? (forthcoming), available at 
http://publish.uwo.ca/~strosow/Sabo_Bill_Paper.pdf. 
 206. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Com-
mercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–08 (2001); Sichelman, su-
pra note 19, at 5–6 (arguing that patent law as an inducement to invent does 
not sufficiently capture the incentives needed for further commercialization). 
 207. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22 (pointing to policy levers and 
the fact that patent law is applied in different ways in different industries, but 
not necessarily through a reasoned approach). 
 208. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 25, at 109–65 (arguing that 
courts can use existing policy levers to achieve a tailored patent approach that 
is responsive to the needs of different industries and technologies); see also 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09 (concluding that patents work 
well as property in some fields of technology and some industries some of the 
time). 
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nities for more refined strategies should be explored.209 These 
strategies need to encompass evolving innovation paradigms 
and the multi-faceted nature of innovative activity.210 They 
need to respond to multiple innovative communities, including 
commercial firms, scientific researchers, user innovator com-
munities, and open source proponents.211 
I suggest that disagreement persists about the type and 
level of tailoring of patent law that should occur in part because 
explanations of how patents change innovation are inadequate. 
By targeting the organization of innovation as the focus of pa-
tent policy, the organizational approach offers a coherent 
framework for examining ways in which patent law should be 
tailored to fit different contexts.212 A central premise of the or-
ganizational approach is that patent law should be designed in 
light of and be tailored to the distinct needs of alternative inno-
vation processes. Selection among alternative approaches 
should be informed by factors such as information asymme-
tries, the nature and specificity of investments required, the 
importance of informal rules in shaping relationships among 
participants, and the structure of the markets within which 
such activities take place. Moreover, patent law needs to be re-
sponsive and adaptable to emerging modes of innovation. In 
some cases, such as the evolution of standard setting organiza-
tions to address the coordination needs of related technologies, 
this may mean limiting regulation to provide greater opportu-
nities for private ordering, but with some protection against 
                                                          
 209. Carroll, for example, advocates a pragmatic, evidence-based economics 
approach to tailoring measures, which takes into account information costs 
relating to who can pick the winning technologies and the cost and political 
feasibility of tailoring measures. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit 
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1361, 1410–1414 (2009) (advocating for a pragmatic, evidence-based economics 
approach as basis for selecting among tailoring policies. Factors include ques-
tions of who has the best information, costs of administering the system, and 
considerations of political economy). 
 210. While innovation and economic growth are sometimes referred to al-
most interchangeably as desired outcomes of the patent system, for example, 
innovation is only one factor in economic growth and does not always result in 
what we might think of as economic growth. There may also be non-economic 
objectives or values to address, such as issues of equity and a transformational 
impact of certain kinds of property rights, which need to be captured in the 
analysis of patent policy. 
 211. Strandburg, supra note 44, at 867. 
 212. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1578. 
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opportunistic behavior.213 In other cases, such as the search for 
vaccines in the face of a potential public health emergency, it 
may mean recognizing and accommodating a broad government 
role in the innovation process. Recent work documenting the 
prevalence and importance of alternative systems of innovation 
highlight the importance of unpacking the concept of innova-
tion and recognizing the institutional context within which dif-
ferent forms of innovation take place and the resulting implica-
tions for patent policy.214 
The framework offered in Part III provides a useful start-
ing point in exploring when and how patent laws might have 
differential effects that should be addressed through a change 
in patent law or how it is interpreted and applied. At the most 
basic level, there may be a cognitive, behavioral or psychologi-
cal aspect to the choice of property right system that selects for 
or against certain modes of innovation.215 The availability of 
private ownership rights may create a tipping point, transform-
ing systems of open collaboration into systems of proprietary 
ownership and use, once assets become more valuable. Free 
rider problems may limit the ability to form open collaborative 
innovation communities without some ability to pre-commit to 
participation. Interesting questions include how the presence of 
patents changes the ways that innovators think about collabo-
rating and how it alters the relationships between members of 
collaborations. Where the understanding and interpretation of 
patent law involves conceptions of fairness and empowerment, 
                                                          
 213. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source 
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Con-
ference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Working Paper, Nov. 13, 
2004,), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661543 
(to access article, select One-Click Download). 
 214. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 146; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompli-
ance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedi-
cal Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059 (2008); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. 
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cul-
tural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); Strandburg, supra note 
44, at 904–05. 
 215. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1484–92 (2010) (looking at the difference in standards for 
protectibility in patent and copyright law from the perspective of the psycholo-
gy of creativity and creation, and emphasizing the aspects of problem solving 
and the ability to embrace newness in scientific and engineering inventions). 
Fromer also suggests that the law needs to address how to treat protected 
forms of creativity that do not fit the archetype of creativity for the relevant IP 
regimes. Id. 
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for example, and where norms for flexible use of and respect for 
patent rights emerge, the formal institution of patent law may 
become more effective as a tool for innovation. Similarly, where 
the system is regarded as exploitative or inefficient, or norms 
develop which involve ignoring intellectual property rights, the 
effectiveness of the patent system may decline. Examples of pa-
tent law research beginning to take place at this level include 
the study of how norms of information production and infor-
mation sharing develop and interact with formal rules, such as 
the allocations of property rights.216 Studies of creativity and 
processes of scientific discovery can suggest characteristics that 
may usefully inform the construction of patent laws.217 
Informal rules—level two of the framework—play an im-
portant role in the development and dissemination of 
knowledge, and in the interaction of norms of “free” or “semi-
free” information sharing with patent law; this is a subject of 
growing concern, particularly in the context of academic sci-
ence.218 Alternative modes of innovation emerge that are con-
structed around norms of open access. Consider, for example, 
user innovators—or lead users—who develop technology for 
their own use, and are involved in free innovation transfers. 
These “lead users” innovate in order to solve their own ahead of 
market needs, providing new and improved products, often 
without any intent or action to patent their contributions.219 
                                                          
 216. This has been the subject of much discussion in the context of patent 
rights obtained over the fruits of basic research. See Robert P. Merges, A New 
Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 197 (2004) (discuss-
ing concerns about the “propertization” of the public domain); see also Eisen-
berg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, supra note 35. 
 217. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 215. 
 218. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217–26 (1987) (discuss-
ing the conflict between exclusive rights in research discoveries and academic 
norms); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 698; Robert P. Merges, Proper-
ty Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 145 (1996). 
 219. See Fred Gault & Eric von Hippel, The Prevalence of User Innovation 
and Free Innovation Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and In-
novation Policy at 3 (MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4722-09, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337232 (to access article, select 
One-Click Download) (arguing that statistical indicators of innovation activi-
ties should be modified to reflect the importance of user-innovators in produc-
ing product and process innovations and that given the significance of this 
“free” innovation we should be more skeptical about the need for strong patent 
rights). 
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User innovator communities are often characterized by a “free 
revealing” of their innovations with others in response to pri-
vate benefits that they can obtain as a result, such as recogni-
tion, adoption of certain generally available technologies, or the 
exchange of contributions from others.220 The informal rules 
which sustain free revealing may override, or come into conflict 
with, formal rules of ownership over the information. In “open 
source” software development projects, contributors commit to 
make their contributions available for duplication and use 
without charge.221 Patents may serve to undermine certain 
types of innovation structures by interfering with norms of in-
formation sharing. Alternatively, they may strengthen the sys-
tems by creating mechanisms for enforcing the sharing of in-
formation, like through open source licensing. As an example, 
the open source model of software has managed to co-exist with 
proprietary software ownership and, indeed, has utilized intel-
lectual property rights to formalize and perpetuate the open 
source model through license agreements such as the General 
Public License. 
Focusing on levels three and four of the framework, the ex-
isting literature suggests that the connection between patents 
and market structure is critical.222 Industry-specific studies, 
and applications of industrial organization to the study of pa-
tents and innovation—in particular market structures—move 
in the right direction. Examples include the study of industries 
where standard setting is important and where technological 
progress is characterized by incremental, cumulative innova-
tion.223 The organizational approach to innovation connects in-
                                                          
 220. See Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from 
Open-Source Software, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 84, 85 (2001). 
 221. See, e.g., James Bessen, What Good is Free Software?, in 
GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 14–18 (Robert W. 
Hahn ed., 2002). 
 222. Attention is increasingly directed towards theories of patents and 
market structure, spurred by the work of Lemley, Merges, Barnett, and oth-
ers. Overall patent scholars have been much slower than anti-trust scholars to 
turn their attention to issues of market structure and the organization of in-
novation. 
 223. E.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemary Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox 
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Indus-
try, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001) (conducting interviews of 
industry representatives and analyzing the industries patenting behavior); 
Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Policy, supra note 22, at 1619–24 (cit-
ing examples from different industries). 
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dustry-specific and technology-specific studies and models to 
inform proposals for a more tailored approach to patent poli-
cy.224 The effectiveness of patents in furthering desirable forms 
of economic behavior depends on a variety of factors. Examples 
offered by the existing patent literature, particularly NIE-
based work, include differences in the levels of investment 
needed to develop technologies and the risks of appropriation, 
differences in licensing costs in different markets,225 relative 
costs of increased incentives to pioneer inventors versus the 
costs of impeding incremental improvers,226 and industry-
specific factors that allow for patents to perform better or worse 
as property rights.227 Norms can also play a role in influencing 
what types of collaborative practices are considered.228 
The organizational approach offers a way of incorporating 
these different factors into patent policy design because it looks 
at the organization of innovation with the recognition that effi-
cient organizational form will be context dependent. In moving 
away from a uniform patent law, however, we need to consider 
whether selection between paths of innovation is an appropri-
ate domain for patent lawmakers. As North reminds us, insti-
tutions are inherently imperfect. They are subject to the ideas, 
ideologies, and interests of those who govern. How much gov-
ernment intervention do we want in selecting for or against al-
ternative forms of innovation? Decisions about the nature of 
the tailoring must also be made in light of the costs of adminis-
tering such detailed rules and the limitations of both decision-
makers and implementers of the rules. A slightly different but 
equally important policy implication is that the government is, 
whether directly or indirectly, selecting for or against certain 
kinds of innovation through patent policy.229 In certain coun-
                                                          
 224. See, e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 222, at 101; Peter Lee, Towards 
a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 924–25; Fiona 
Murray, The Stem Cell Market: Patents and the Pursuit of Scientific Progress, 
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2341, 2343 (2007). 
 225. See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 120, at 62–65 (arguing that 
the ideal design of an intellectual property system depends on the ease with 
which rights holders can enter into licensing and other contractual arrange-
ments involving these rights). 
 226. See id. at 68. 
 227. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 91–94. 
 228. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2169, 2169 (2009) (discussing the focus of universities on narrow licensing 
practices and the need to explore broader forms of collaboration in their tech-
nology transfer practices). 
 229. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 221, at 26–32. See also Rebecca S. Eisen-
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tries, such as China, there have been considerations of whether 
government users should be required to use open source tech-
nologies.230 The selection can be implicit in patent policies that 
do not take into account the selective effect of the rules on dif-
ferent types of innovation. While recognizing the dangers of a 
government-driven system of innovation and the advantages of 
a decentralized innovation policy, we need some way of evaluat-
ing whether regulatory approaches are effectively targeting the 
most beneficial activities and addressing the multiple goals 
that the institutions are designed to serve.231 Focusing on the 
intersection of rules and organization provides the framework 
within which such a discussion can take place.232 
C. THE NEED FOR ROBUSTNESS AND THE SECOND BEST RULE 
A key implication of the organizational approach and its 
underlying assumptions about economic behavior is that patent 
laws should be designed with the expectation of opportunistic 
behavior and should be robust to the consequences of such be-
havior. This means that patent laws should be designed in light 
of propensities for over-patenting, the abuse of continuations, 
and patent trolling, taking into account the positive and nega-
tive effects of such behavior on the cost and feasibility of differ-
ent modes of innovation. 
Opportunistic behavior can arise when contracts are neces-
                                                          
berg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem 
Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21 1187 (2006) (illustrating the im-
portance of the intersection of public funding and patent policy regarding pub-
licly funded inventions in shaping innovation outcomes). 
 230. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: 
Open Source and Beyond, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 111 (2005). 
 231. See, e.g., Madison et al., supra note 214, at 659 (examining the inter-
section of IP and its interactions with other legal and social mechanisms of 
governing creativity and innovation through the study of intellectual shar-
ing/pooling arrangements and the construction of cultural commons arrange-
ments); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 579–81 (2006). 
 232. Key questions to inform this analysis include: What is the relative im-
portance of different types of innovation and how, if at all, should patent law 
respond? To what extent do patent laws select for or against different types of 
organizations, such as joint ventures, collaborations, and small versus large 
firms, and does this matter for innovation outcomes? When will private actors 
adapt their modes of innovation to neutralize the effects of patent law? 
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sarily incomplete or information is imperfect.233 The potential 
for costly opportunism is particularly severe where asset-
specific or relationship-specific investments are required in the 
face of imperfect information and high transaction costs. Patent 
laws should therefore be designed to reduce situations of in-
complete, particularly asymmetric, information, and to reduce 
the cost and uncertainty of establishing the boundaries of pa-
tent rights. A number of patent reform proposals that have re-
ceived attention by commentators and policy-makers can be ex-
plained and justified in light of this approach. 
For example, the organizational approach provides a justi-
fication for Lemley’s and Kimberly A. Moore’s proposal to re-
strict the ability to file continuation patent applications, which 
allow patent applicants to abandon and re-file applications or 
to keep applications on file while pursuing related applications 
on the same invention.234 Continuations can create problems 
such as introducing delay and uncertainty for competitors be-
cause they must guess about pending claims, obtaining broader 
patents due to persistence rather than merit, and using of stra-
tegic practices of drafting claims that cover competitor products 
or surprising established producers who are unaware of the 
pending application. 
The organizational approach similarly supports James 
Bessen’s and Michael J. Meurer’s call for improving the notice 
function of patents by increasing the transparency of the patent 
process and the predictability and visibility of patent bounda-
ries.235 These efforts help to increase the information that eco-
nomic actors have before they make project-specific or relation-
ship-specific investments and improve the ability of patents to 
perform effectively as property. 
The organizational approach is of particular assistance in 
guiding responses to patent trolling, since the practice involves 
                                                          
 233. See Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 144, at 30–
31. 
 234. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Con-
tinuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 64–66 (2004) (describing the harm caused by 
abuse of continuations practice and proposing restricting, or even abolishing, 
continuation practice). 
 235. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 7 (“The economic effectiveness of 
any property system depends not just on what it sets out to do, but also on the 
laws, regulations, institutions, and norms that implement the system.”). 
Bessen and Meurer also argue that an effective property system must improve 
the implementation of patent laws in a way that satisfies the notice require-
ment of property rights. Id. at 235–36. 
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an analysis of the transactional structures of patent owners 
and patent users and the transaction costs of asserting patents 
against producers of existing goods. Level three and four of the 
framework encompass many of the tools for unpacking this 
type of strategic behavior and its implications for organization-
al and market structure. Patent trolling is often used to de-
scribe the opportunistic enforcement of patents against infring-
ers—generally with no intention to manufacture or market the 
patented invention—with the hope of extracting licensing fees 
that exceed the contribution of the invention to the user. Con-
cerns about patent trolls have fueled some of the most signifi-
cant proposed changes to the patent statute and have elicited 
strong reactions from the courts.236 Rather than viewing such 
behavior as abhorrent, the organizational approach suggests 
that such behavior is to be expected and may even serve the 
function of enabling secondary markets and increasing asset 
liquidity.237 Attention then focuses on if, when, and how such 
behavior impacts transaction costs and transactional structures 
in the areas where opportunities for trolling arise, and how to 
reduce those costs through rule change. The organizational ap-
proach supports measures that increase the visibility and 
transparency of patent rights, reducing the asymmetries in in-
formation that patent “trolls” capitalize on. Similarly, the or-
ganizational approach supports proposals to include considera-
tions of “contribution” of a patent to a product seeking to 
address the patent hold-up problem. Although concerns do 
arise over whether these “contributions” can be measured in an 
accurate, or at least predictable, way. More careful analysis of 
the use of injunctions in cases of patent infringement is also an 
appropriate response, although the absence of a general consid-
eration for market-wide effects of an injunction limit its effec-
tiveness, making it a blunt instrument. As Robert Merges ar-
gues, use of injunctions can provide the type of institutional 
adjustment that is needed to adapt patent rights to shifting 
                                                          
 236. See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-
Seeking and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1585–87 
(2009). 
 237. See, e.g., id. at 1584–86 (examining how property rights systems can 
lose traction with the underlying economic situations they govern and examin-
ing the challenges of rent seeking and the pressures it can put on innovation 
and advocating institutional adjustments such as the eBay revision of stand-
ards for injunctive relief). 
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economic conditions and their underlying transactional struc-
tures.238 Patent policy-makers must also be proactive in antici-
pating the behaviors of private actors who are seeking to max-
imize profits from their patent rights in evolving systems of 
technology and business. 
D. INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW: NORMS & COMPLIANCE 
IP is essentially becoming the world’s currency of innova-
tion. In this new environment, the global legal, economic, and 
innovation communities bear the challenge and responsibility of 
creating a market-based, stable exchange rate for the currency of 
innovation by fostering greater understanding and respect for 
IP.239 
If intellectual property is the world’s currency of innova-
tion, then an understanding of how international patent law 
works, and how it connects with domestic patent law is critical 
to effective patent policy. The emergence of the international 
intellectual property framework complicates domestic U.S. pa-
tent policy. The two systems diverge in terms of how rules are 
developed, applied, and enforced; the policies and policy-
makers shaping U.S. patent law have historically been differ-
ent from those driving international patent laws and patent 
policy. While domestic law relies on statutes and formal rules, 
international law relies heavily on custom. Yet the two systems 
increasingly intersect. They intersect on an administrative lev-
el through legal cases that have extra-territorial aspects and 
through concerns about compliance of domestic laws with an 
international framework. They intersect on a broader policy 
level in light of the globalization of markets and innovation 
processes. Traditional approaches to patent law, with their ab-
straction from the institutional environment in which rules are 
generated and enforced, and their primary focus on market-
based incentive theories, do not readily generalize to interna-
tional law settings. Nor do they help us to explore the effects of 
globalization on domestic patent law. As a result, domestic pa-
tent policy remains largely disconnected from international pa-
tent policy and the study of international patent law and policy 
                                                          
 238. Id. at 1586. 
 239. David J. Kappos, Under Secretary, Speech to the National Bureau of 
Economic Research at the National Press Club (Apr. 20, 2010) available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2010/Remarks_Kappos_Economic_Resear
ch.jsp. 
6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 2:20 PM 
268 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:1 
 
 
remains under-theorized.240 The organizational approach can 
provide a broader understanding of how international patent 
law operates and how international rules might intersect with 
domestic rules. Applying the approach suggests that interna-
tional patent policy should include a broader role for interna-
tional norm building; it should be informed by broad principles 
of compliance that are sensitive to local norms and legal system 
capacity. The approach supports recent proposals for organiza-
tional innovation in the form of administrative solutions to 
some of the challenges of international patent lawmaking and 
enforcement, as discussed below.241 
The traditional starting point for thinking about interna-
tional patent law is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which provides the dominant 
formal legal framework for international patent law.242 TRIPS 
is housed within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a rules-
based international environment which has the stated objective 
of promoting international trade.243 TRIPS provides minimum 
levels of protection that each member state needs to provide to 
the intellectual property of other members. It also includes cer-
tain broad principles, including national treatment, most-
favored nation treatment, and the principle that intellectual 
                                                          
 240. However, important contributions have been made. See generally 
Margaret Chon, Substantive Equality in International Intellectual Property 
Norm-Setting, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Daniel 
Gervais ed., 2007); Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, Designing a Glob-
al Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO and 
Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187 (2009); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic In-
novation, Development and Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in 
Global Administrative Law (Inst. Int’l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 08-66, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1316925 (to access article, select One-Click Download); Strandburg, supra 
note 44. 
 241. See Merges, supra note 216; see also Eisenberg, supra note 35. 
 242. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (establishing a 
multilateral agreement creating minimum protection standards for various 
forms of intellectual property among Member States). 
 243. See Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies 
_e/casestudies_e.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (“[T]he WTO creates a 
framework within which sovereign decision-making can unleash important 
opportunities or undermine the potential benefits flowing from a rules-based 
international environment that promotes open trade.”). 
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property protection should “contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology.”244 This third principle in particular reflects the 
fact that the TRIPS framework must accommodate countries 
with very different needs and interests, and that its implemen-
tation should reflect normative concerns such as access to 
health. Many of the proposals for international patent policy 
change take the form of proposed changes to the TRIPS frame-
work, such as efforts to build in expanded or restricted abilities 
to use compulsory licensing and expanded or restricted defini-
tions of patentable subject matter.245 The mechanisms for ef-
fecting change in the rules and their enforcement are complex 
and go beyond simple law-making processes. Moreover, a 
change in the rules doesn’t go very far in changing behavior, as 
demonstrated by the relative lack of utilization of the compul-
sory licensing provisions fought for as part of the Doha Decla-
ration.246 Finally, it is difficult to connect the changes proposed 
at the international level with implications for domestic patent 
law and domestic innovation. 
The organizational approach moves us beyond the view of 
international patent law as simply a system of formal rules and 
towards a view of the system as a set of both formal and infor-
mal rules that are the product of the diverse relationships and 
arrangements that shape the system’s development, adoption, 
and economic impact. The organizational approach suggests 
that a first step in more effective reform of international patent 
law is to recognize the relative importance of informal rules in 
international law-making, implementation, and enforcement. 
Informal rules play a significant role in shaping international 
law, and in determining how agreed upon rules are interpreted, 
implemented, and enforced.247 A variety of actors, both public 
                                                          
 244. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 242, at 1200. 
 245. See generally Gervais, supra note 197 (analyzing the TRIPS agree-
ment, with particular emphasis on the impact intellectual property has on 
economic activity). 
 246. See Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater 
Flexibility and a Non-Justiciability Solution, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 743, 
746–751 (2003). 
 247. See, e.g., Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Business Regulation in 
Local Context, in A GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW IN ASIA 13–16 (Pitman B. Potter 
& Ljiljana Biuković eds., 2008) (proposing a selective adaption paradigm 
which addresses the implementation of international legal norms in the con-
text of local culture and legal traditions). 
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and private, participate in this process.248 As Dinwoodie notes, 
the “shape of international intellectual property law is being 
determined by the interaction of numerous components of the 
system.”249 There are multiple participants in norm creation: 
both domestic and international, public, and private. In some 
cases the norms may conflict with each other or with the estab-
lished rules. Tensions also exist between uniform international 
norms and national autonomy.250 A second step is to recognize 
the importance of limited institutional capacity in responding 
to formal and even informal rule changes.251 Local practices, 
regulatory infrastructure, and local cultural norms are im-
portant factors in determining compliance with both formal and 
informal rules. The approach advocates concepts which take in-
to account the limited institutional capacity of different coun-
tries and the different cultural and social norms through which 
formal rules are filtered. Notions of compliance, which capture 
both adoption of rules and the constraints on their implementa-
tion and enforcement, provide a useful conceptual framework 
for analysis.252 
Third, the organizational approach supports proposals for 
innovation in the organization of law making and enforcement. 
Current work in the interface of domestic and international pa-
tent law explores the need for mechanisms to accommodate na-
tional courts and national interests in international patent law 
making.253 The administrative structure of international patent 
                                                          
 248. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law 
System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 205, 206 (2006). 
 249. Id. at 10. 
 250. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Prop-
erty Lawmaking, supra note 240, at 95–96. 
 251. See, e.g., SAMUEL WANGWE ET AL., CASE STUDY FOR STUDY 9: 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN IP POLICY-MAKING, 
ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT, UGANDA 12–14 (2002). (looking at the 
challenges of developing and implementing an IP system in Uganda in light of 
the obligations of the TRIPS framework). 
 252. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 247, at 12–13 (arguing that international 
law can acquire a variety of local meanings that require an understanding of 
the local history and culture in addition to knowledge of the domestic economy 
and laws). 
 253. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International 
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1010–13 (2002) (ex-
amining how the system of international IP lawmaking is changing and dis-
cussing the need for mechanisms to enhance the role of national courts that 
were historically largely excluded from lawmaking process); Graeme B. 
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law becomes a central part of international patent policy under 
this approach. Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie argue that the process 
of international intellectual property law should be the primary 
focus of attention, and that new administrative structures are 
needed to guide the development of international intellectual 
property law. Internationalization of intellectual property law 
is seen as occurring quickly through the activities of multiple 
participants and the impact of global trade and digital technol-
ogies. Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie call for the recalibration of the 
balance between national and international norms through 
careful choice of institutional structures and gathering of in-
formation needed to make choices about international patent 
law fairly and consciously.254 “Organizations such as the WTO 
and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) evolve in 
response to the needs and interests of different stakeholders, 
with implications for both rule development and rule enforce-
ment.”255 
E. PATENTS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The study of entrepreneurship and its determinants has 
been largely confined to disciplines other than law. A large and 
growing business literature supports the importance of entre-
preneurship as a vehicle of economic progress and growth and 
explores the determinants of entrepreneurship and the varia-
bles that contribute to the success and failure of new ventures. 
But despite the importance of intangible assets in new business 
ventures and the role of ideas and control over these ideas in 
fueling entrepreneurship, the relationship between patents and 
entrepreneurship has received little attention from patent 
scholars.256 If we agree that entrepreneurs play an important 
                                                          
Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307, 307–08 (2000). 
 254. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, supra note 240, at 95–97 (examining the extent to which 
TRIPs dispute resolution adequately accommodates the operation of each 
member’s political economy as it relates to intellectual property lawmaking). 
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International In-
tellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
431 (2004) (examining the scope for domestic responses to public domain in 
the face of international legal frameworks governing patent law). 
 255. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 248, at 207–10 (examining interna-
tional norm creation by a wide range of institutions, both public and private, 
and the implications for the future development of the international IP sys-
tem). 
 256. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted M. Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Pa-
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role in driving innovation, then how patents influence entre-
preneurial activities, the performance of start-up ventures, and 
the structure and nature of entrepreneurial markets should be 
an area of focus for patent policy-makers.257 The Berkeley Pa-
tent Survey is one of the few attempts to uncover the broader 
relationships between patents and entrepreneurship, exploring 
patenting behavior of a large selection of high technology en-
trepreneurs. The results suggest that the patterns and drivers 
of patent-holding are industry and context-specific, with ven-
ture capital financing as an important variable in differentiat-
ing behavior.258 Evidence supports the assertion that patents 
are used for strategic reasons such as improving bargaining po-
sitions in cross-licensing, as well as signaling reasons such as 
securing early stage investment. 259 The cost of obtaining and 
enforcing patent rights appears to be a significant variable. 
Overall, the results suggest the importance of context in de-
termining use.260 The organizational approach provides a way 
of integrating the context and connecting empirical findings 
such as these to determine how to encourage entrepreneurship 
through patent law change. 
By starting with the human arrangements that drive al-
ternative processes of innovation, the organizational approach 
acknowledges the importance of human agency in the process 
of innovation. It allows for distinctions between different types 
of economic behavior at the level of the individual, the organi-
zation, and the market. Where there are actors that seem to 
play a particularly important role in driving innovation, the 
characteristics of these actors and factors that facilitate or im-
pede their actions become an important area of policy focus. Fo-
                                                          
tent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1070 (2008); Ted M. Sichelman & Stuart 
J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 113 (2010). 
 257. For the importance of entrepreneurs as agents of change, see Douglass 
C. North, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Under-
standing of the Transition Problems, in WIDER ANNUAL LECTURES 1, 7 (Mar. 
1997), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/annual-
lectures/en_GB/AL1. 
 258. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pamela Samuelson & Ted 
M. Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results 
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1326–27 
(2009). 
 259. See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 256, at 112–13 (presenting evi-
dence as to why innovators patent their new technologies). 
 260. Id. 
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cusing on cognition provides a useful context for exploring the 
characteristics, motivations, and decision-making of the entre-
preneur, with implications for how patents might influence be-
havior.261 There is at least anecdotal evidence that patents 
could have an empowerment function.262 The notion that one 
can “own” their own ideas and create valuable assets out of 
their own intellectual efforts can encourage individuals to pur-
sue their initiatives in a business world that they might other-
wise feel was inaccessible. There is both a psychological compo-
nent and a practical business component to the notion of 
intellectual property as property that can be self-created, with 
limited external resources. At the broader social level, cultural 
and social understanding about patents and intellectual prop-
erty ownership more generally could create a climate conducive 
to entrepreneurship, just as the bankruptcy laws and the ac-
ceptability of failure has been thought to contribute to the will-
ingness to engage in risky new ventures.263 General norms 
about risk taking and historical practices of investment might 
be influenced by patent policies, influencing at least the financ-
ing of entrepreneurial activities. The different psychologies of 
creativity and scientific or technical invention may also justify 
differences in formal rules.264 Recognizing the interaction be-
tween informal rules and formal rules, the organizational ap-
proach captures the potential of entrepreneurial acts and be-
liefs to shape the direction of innovation and influence the roles 
that patents may play in innovation processes.265 
                                                          
 261. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright In-
centives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Jonathan Remy Nash & Staphanie M. 
Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449 (2010); Jennifer W. Scangos, 
Comment, Instinct and Rationality: An Evolutionary Approach to Intellectual 
Property Law, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 65 (2010). 
 262. For anecdotal evidence, see the life and work of National Foundation 
for Teaching Entrepreneurship founder Steve Mariotti. But see Torrance & 
Tomlinson, supra note 143, at 135. 
 263. See generally Mike W. Peng, Yasuhiro Yamakawa, & Seung-Hyun 
Lee, Bankruptcy Laws and Entrepreneur-Friendliness, 34 ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 517 (2009). 
 264. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2010) (examining patent laws and copyright laws in 
light of psychology literature on creativity and different aspects of the creative 
processes for different works and inventions). 
 265. See, e.g., Sarah Kaplan & Fiona Murray, Entrepreneurship and the 
Construction of Value in Biotechnology, 29 RES. IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORG. 
107, 107–8 (2010) (“[T]he burgeoning literature on institutional entrepreneur-
ship . . . argues precisely that neither the technology nor the institutional en-
vironment is fixed and that multiple actors with multiple goals . . . act to 
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Most of the existing research connecting patents to entre-
preneurship has focused on the roles patents might play in ob-
taining financing for new ventures. The relationships between 
entrepreneurs, their employees, their financers, their suppliers, 
and their customers can be usefully explored by looking at the 
intersection of formal rules and governance structures. At the 
pre-financing level, patents can serve an information function, 
signaling the value of intangible assets and human capital to 
potential funders in a way that facilitates the financial transac-
tion.266 Patents can also facilitate financing of early stage ven-
tures by providing investors with property rights over intangi-
ble assets.267 Post-financing, venture capital backed firms tend 
to have higher patenting. This can be explained in terms of the 
higher innovation levels of venture-backed companies (a plus) 
or in terms of the short-term nature of venture capital strate-
gies, with their interest in creating signals of market value to 
allow for early exit.268 
The organizational approach also provides opportunities to 
tie in relevant research from other disciplines in order to refine 
patent strategies to promote entrepreneurship. At the level of 
the firm, the management, operations research, and organiza-
tional design literature offer interesting insights into the con-
nection between organizational structure, information systems, 
and knowledge generation and transfer, with under-explored 
implications for patent law.269 Exploring firm structures that 
                                                          
shape the institutional setup that would govern activities in a particular 
field.”). 
 266. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002) 
(discussing patents as mechanisms for firms to signal their R&D capacity and 
the value of their intellectual assets to attract financing and licensing oppor-
tunities). 
 267. See Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 1024–28. 
 268. See, e.g., Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert, Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars 
Persson, Venture Capital Financing of Innovation, Patenting, and Long-Run 
Performance of Private Acquisitions (Massey U. C. of Bus. Res., Working Paper 
No. 13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629226 (to access article, 
select One-Click Download) (examining the relationship between venture capi-
tal financing, patent intensity, and firm performance in light of facts such as 
the higher patent count of VC intensive industries, and also studying the in-
centive effects such as role of patents in signaling company value prior to exit). 
 269. The study of how firm structure influences knowledge management 
offers an alternative entry point for studying characteristics of firms that are 
successful innovators. See Richard Baskerville & Alina Dulipovici, The Theo-
retical Foundations of Knowledge Management, 4 KNOWLEDGE MGMT. RES. & 
PRAC. 83, 90–92 (2006). 
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are particularly effective, or ineffective, at producing and utiliz-
ing new technologies and investigating what role, if any, pa-
tents play in sustaining those structures may offer new in-
sights into the impact of patent law on innovation. Theories of 
knowledge management and spillover can be used to study the 
interaction between incumbent firms and entrepreneurs in the 
presence and absence of intellectual property rights.270 A par-
ticularly fruitful avenue for exploring the intersection of intel-
lectual property and entrepreneurship lies in the study of or-
ganizational responses to opportunities and obstacles in 
cumulative innovation. Examples include the study of how the 
conditions surrounding the access and use of an innovation im-
pact the ability of others to innovate cumulatively.271 Industrial 
organization and game theory can help in exploring the effects 
of changing market structures on entrepreneurship. The ex-
pansion of markets for technology may, for example, either en-
hance the development of new ventures by providing greater 
access to new technologies with commercial potential, or reduce 
it by pushing innovators to sell early to large purchasers rather 
than accept the risk of self-development. Comparisons can be 
drawn between the ability of big and small firms to innovate 
and the potential costs of hierarchy and size in limiting entre-
preneurial activity, and this can be tied to the roles that pa-
tents may play in allowing or impeding efforts to spin off ideas 
and create new ventures or, conversely, to block the develop-
ment of competing technologies.272 This type of research can be 
used to provide the contextual framework within which to 
reexamine the implications of existing studies within the pa-
                                                          
 270. See, e.g., Zoltan J. Acs, Pontus Braunerhjelm, David B. Audretsch & 
Bo Carlsson, The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, 32 SMALL 
BUS. ECON. 15, 15–19 (2009) (looking at the source of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities and tying it to knowledge and ideas created in incumbent organiza-
tions, and suggesting that entrepreneurial opportunities are not exogenous 
but instead systematically created by investments in knowledge); Zoltan J. Acs 
& Mark Sanders, Intellectual Property Rights and the Knowledge Spillover 
Theory of Entrepreneurship § I (Jena Econ. Res. Papers, Paper No. 2008–069, 
2008), available at http://edoc.mpg.de/get.epl?fid=52283&did=399807&ver=0 
(arguing that, up to a point, stronger IP rights may facilitate entrepreneur-
ship, but at some point, expanding IP rights may dampen the incentives of en-
trepreneurs). 
 271. See, e.g., Fiona Murray & Siobhán O’Mahony, Exploring the Founda-
tions of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science, 18 
ORG. SCI. 1006, 1006–07 (2007); J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal 
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1743, 1744–45 (2000). 
 272. See generally Sichelman & Graham, supra note 256. 
6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2012 2:20 PM 




Studies of the academic-firm interface offer important in-
sights into roles that patents might play in science-based en-
trepreneurship. The role of academic scientists in the process of 
creating and growing new ventures is particularly significant in 
the life sciences, where much of the basic research underlying 
drug discovery and development is conducted in universities 
and other non-profit research labs. They participate in venture 
creation and development through consulting, sponsored re-
search, and other forms of collaboration that can involve trans-
fer of both human and social capital.273 Patents offer mecha-
nisms for structuring collaborations that might otherwise be 
unavailable, but in allocating ownership and control over the 
fruits of collaboration they might also foreclose certain types of 
research and collaborative activity. Despite the importance of 
these activities, the effects of science-based entrepreneurship 
and, in particular, the roles of patents in promoting it, on the 
conduct of academic science have yet to be fully understood.274 
Policy implications uncovered by an organizational approach 
include tailoring of patent policy to include broader research 
use exemptions to distinguish between applied and basic re-
search.275 
CONCLUSION 
Truly among man’s innovations, the use of organization to 
accomplish his ends is among both his greatest and his earli-
est.276 
In 2009 President Obama announced a new “Strategy for 
Innovation” designed to “lay the foundation for the innovation 
                                                          
 273. See, e.g., Fiona Murray, The Role of Academic Inventors in Entrepre-
neurial Firms: Sharing the Laboratory Life, 33 RES. POL. 643, 644 (2004) (ex-
amining the extent and mechanisms through which academic scientists con-
tribute not only human capital but also social capital to entrepreneurial 
firms). 
 274. Cf. Mark Edwards, Fiona Murray & Robert Yu, Gold in the Ivory Tow-
er: Equity Rewards of Outlicensing, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 509, 515 (2006) 
(“[T]he impact of startup involvement on scientific competition, the behavior of 
academic scientists and the diffusion of publicly funded science to a wide audi-
ence has yet to be fully unraveled.”). 
 275. See generally Merges, supra note 41 (proposing broader research use 
exemption). 
 276. KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 224 
(1971). 
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economy of the future,” and updated it in February 2011 to 
build on key aspects of the strategy.277 The policy calls for 
strengthening competitive markets through regulatory reform 
and a rethinking of the relationship between public and private 
sectors, for government intervention in key sectors where 
“markets may fail on their own,” and for increased investment 
in the basic infrastructure underlying systems of innovation.278 
A key theme in the national innovation policy is the importance 
of collaboration and the need to foster new and improved re-
gional and local systems of innovation.279 The America 
COMPETES Act, passed in 2007 and reauthorized in 2011, 
emphasizes the use of organizational strategies to support in-
novation. These strategies include fostering new kinds of col-
laboration, particularly public-private collaborations such as 
those between universities, government labs, and firms, and 
supporting new forms of economic organization, such as the 
creation of regional innovation clusters.280 Although the patent 
system was created for the purpose of encouraging innovation, 
patent policy is marginalized in current national innovation 
strategies. This paper provides a way of answering this puzzle 
and, more importantly, a way of making patent policy more rel-
evant to innovation policy. I have argued that the neglect of pa-
tents as important tools in furthering the goals of national in-
novation strategies can be explained at least in part by the 
focus of traditional approaches to patent policy on incentives to 
invent rather than efforts to support innovation systems. 
                                                          
 277. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at i; see also A Strategy for Amer-
ican Innovation: Securing Our Growth and Prosperity, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/innovation/strategy. 
 278. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at ii (introducing a national in-
novation strategy built around government investment in key areas of innova-
tion and in the infrastructure and other “inputs” of innovation and promotion 
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This Article has made the case for a reorientation of patent 
policy to focus on the mechanisms through which patents alter 
the nature and cost of transactions supporting systems of inno-
vation. The organizational approach that I have proposed pro-
motes the design of patent laws that are more narrowly tai-
lored to the particular needs of alternative innovation 
processes, focused on reducing the propensity for behaviors 
which are most costly to the organization of economic activities, 
robust to constraints on rule design and implementation, and 
sensitive to alternative mechanisms for regulating behavior. By 
adopting such an approach, policymakers can produce more ef-
fective strategies for patent policy design in real world settings 
characterized by bounded rationality, market imperfections, 
and constraints on efficient rule change. Existing applications 
of New Institutional Economics to patent law have offered im-
portant insights into how patents impact the organization of 
economic activities. But such efforts have thus far remained on 
the sidelines in policy discussions, operating largely in isolation 
from other theories and at a level that is either too abstract or 
too descriptive to map readily into practical policy prescriptions 
Recognizing that some level of abstraction from reality is essen-
tial in policy design, the organizational approach provides a 
way of capturing critical features of real world innovation pro-
cesses without losing analytical rigor and empirical testability. 
It offers an opportunity for integrating existing patent theories 
and empirical work in a way that can test the theories’ robust-
ness and give them greater explanatory power, and it offers 
new avenues for exploring different functions of patents that 
may have been neglected or overlooked by mainstream ap-
proaches. Most importantly, it provides a way of demonstrating 
the relevance of patents to key objectives of modern national 
innovation strategies. 
Significant challenges remain in this form of analysis. 
Questions arise, for example, about how to apply an analysis of 
transaction costs to dynamic systems of innovation in a way 
that can be both modeled and measured, and about how to 
identify the types of transactions and modes of organization 
that will be most favorable to evolving systems of innovation. 
Given the dynamic nature of innovation, institutions must con-
stantly adjust if they are to keep pace in a rapidly changing so-
ciety, but the ways of making institutions such as the patent 
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system adaptively efficient remain the subject of continuing in-
quiry.281 Clearly the challenges facing effective patent policy 
design are significant, and the value of the organizational ap-
proach that I propose remains to be proven by the effectiveness 
of future concrete applications. I conclude, however, that the 
organizational approach seems to be the most promising plat-
form on which to pursue this challenging regulatory agenda. 
Moreover, without such a shift in approach, critical opportuni-






























                                                          
 281. See North, supra note 60, at part VII (“It is adaptive rather than 
allocative efficiency which is the key to long run growth.”). 
